The Hitler Problem. - Review - book review

National Review, Jan 22, 2001 by Jeffrey Hart

Kershaw notices that Hitler devoted very little space in Mein Kampf to those formative events in Munich, displacing his anti-Semitic epiphany backward to Vienna before the war. He believes that Hitler did this because he himself had played no heroic role in Munich. He was a mere spectator, embarrassing to him as he contemplated his "mission" as the savior of Germany.

The Fuhrer state, as Kershaw shows, moved dynamically in a radical direction. Hitler himself was the source of all power because of his hold on the German Volk. There was no need to issue detailed orders. He merely set forth the goals in broad outline, as he had done in Mein Kampf and countless speeches. Here Kershaw introduces an expression I had not known before: "working toward the Fuhrer." Individuals competed for Hitler's favor by divining his wishes and getting things done. Whether building U-boats or bombers, producing artificial rubber, or rounding up and "relocating" Jews, the elites of the Reich "worked toward the Fuhrer." This produced accelerating activity in the direction he was known to favor. Little was to be gained by arguing that the country had enough U-boats, for example. And there were no institutional checks: no Politburo, no highly organized and bureaucratic party. Many of his generals correctly regarded Hitler as a military dilettante and reckless gambler, but as he rolled up success after success, none could gainsay him.

Hitler's "hubris" (the subtitle of Kershaw's first volume) grew through his triumphs, though in fact he had been exploiting the weakness and unpreparedness of powers reluctant to re-fight the Western Front. To a degree he knew this, and therefore felt driven to act before England, especially, was ready to fight. In late summer 1939, he decided to move against Poland, betting that England would not go to war. The Germans crossed the Polish border on September 1. A few days later, England declared war. Angrily, Hitler turned to Ribbentrop and asked, "What now?" His miscalculation led directly to 1945 and the inevitable coming of (to borrow the subtitle of Kershaw's second volume) "nemesis."

Though England was caught unprepared, Hitler's resources were less adequate relative to his enemies than the Kaiser's had been in 1914. Though he came close to defeating England in the summer and fall of 1940, his ME-109 fighter planes were designed for close troop support and lacked the range to protect his heavy bombers. A couple of thousand Spitfire and Hurricane pilots cancelled the projected invasion. Meanwhile, vastly underestimating the reserve capacities of the Soviets, Hitler invaded Russia. Given his military assets, he had started the war on a shoestring and paid the price. "What now," indeed. In short order he had managed to unite against himself a powerful coalition of England, the U.S., and the USSR. His own allies were the have-nots Italy and Japan, neither of which could do him much good (the defeat of Japan took only 15 percent of the U.S. military budget). From that point, it was onward to catastrophe. Kershaw believes that Hitler realized the war was lost as early as 1941, a year that indeed marked the strategic turning point.