The End of an Alliance: It's time to tell the House of Saud goodbye

National Review, Oct 28, 2002 by Alex Alexiev

Over the long run, the key to winning the war against Islamist terror is helping moderates win the political struggle within Islam. The early stages of the war on terror showed much promise in this respect. In a remarkably short time, using a quiet but effective carrot-and-stick approach, Washington was able to effect an about-face in Pakistan's policies, transforming it from an al-Qaeda sponsor to a cooperative ally. Similar changes were secured by similar methods in some other countries known previously as havens for extremists, such as Yemen, Somalia, and Sudan.

Since then, however, the U.S. has failed to pursue a coherent political strategy aimed at de-legitimizing the ideology of Islamic terrorism and undermining the terrorists' sources of support. And it is becoming increasingly clear that the reason for this failure is Washington's unwillingness to risk a rupture with Saudi Arabia. But the Bush administration has to face up to the fact that Riyadh has been-and remains- the main ideological and financial sponsor of Islamic extremism worldwide, and is not at all interested in helping us combat it. Until the administration confronts this reality in a decisive manner, lasting progress in the war on terrorism is unlikely.

Nothing better illustrates the Saudis' intransigence-and the administration's timidity in dealing with it-than two cases of U.S.-Saudi "cooperation" that recently came to light. On March 11, the Treasury Department announced with great fanfare that the U.S. and Saudi Arabia had jointly blocked the funds of the Bosnia and Somalia offices of the "private, charitable, and educational" Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation because it was diverting funds to terrorists. This action, according to Treasury, "opened a new phase in international cooperation to destroy terrorist financing" and proved the "strength of the anti-terror coalition." In reality, Al-Haramain-alongside the World Muslim League-is the Saudis' largest Islamist front organization, controlled directly by the minister of religious affairs and in charge of spending huge amounts of (mostly government) money to promote the radical-Islamist agenda worldwide. It has offices in over 50 countries and operates through Saudi embassies in another 40; as for its Bosnia and Somalia operations, business even there is continuing as usual, despite additional evidence of terrorist ties unearthed by Bosnian police in a raid on June 3. Al-Haramain's director, Aqeel al-Aqeel, noted with satisfaction in early September that "America has tried to establish a link between terrorism and Islamic charitable societies and failed"-and went on to assert that Al-Haramain's donations and activities both have intensified since 9/11. Indeed they have: Al- Haramain has opened three new offices since then.

The second case deals with Wael Hamza Julaidan. A Saudi citizen from a prominent family, Julaidan is known as having had a long and close relationship with Osama bin Laden and is often referred to as a co-founder of al-Qaeda. Though well known for his extremist views, he has also made a career as a Saudi functionary, for instance, as the director of a financial arm of the Saudi-sponsored World Muslim League called the Rabita Trust. Under his direction, the Rabita Trust has been implicated in funding al- Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. It was thus a pleasant surprise when U.S. authorities announced on September 6 that they-in a joint action with Saudi Arabia-had placed Julaidan on the list of people suspected of funding terrorism. Two days later, however, the Saudi interior minister publicly denied that his government was involved in this case, and implied that Julaidan was innocent.

What accounts for the Saudis' blatant unwillingness to cooperate, even as they continue to insist that they are our ally? The answer is very simple: Any genuine help by Riyadh in untangling the complex web financing extremism will inevitably implicate both the Saudi government and countless prominent Saudis. Saudi charities are no more private than were yesterday's Soviet-sponsored "peace-loving" organizations. In a dictatorship of a totalitarian bent like Saudi Arabia's, "private charities" exist for the explicit purpose of carrying out the policy of the state, and that policy will change only if the state is forced to change it. And this will not happen if Washington continues to speak softly and carry no stick.

The more interesting question here is why Saudi Arabia has for years pursued a policy that sooner or later was going to put it on a collision course with the U.S. and the West. The short answer is that by aiding and abetting radical Islam, Riyadh is simply following the logic of its state ideology.

The Saudi state religion, Wahhabist Islam, would have been of no geopolitical consequence had it remained tucked in a corner of the Arabian desert. But-beginning in the 1960s and accelerating thereafter-the Saudi government embarked on a massive campaign to promote this extremist creed throughout the Muslim world. Flush with oil money, Riyadh became the paymaster of most of the new militant Islamic movements. In its aggressive support of radical Islam, the House of Saud was pursuing two goals: It sought to spread its political influence abroad and co-opt extremists at home (who were denouncing the regime's Western orientation).