A dent that counts: how do Republicans win black and Hispanic votes? Well, first you have to ask …

National Review, Dec 13, 2004 by Richard Nadler

This year, 527s running GOP issue ads presented a comparable conservative worldview, in the same minority-media venues. We campaigned on social issues. The Republican 527s ran ads criticizing the Democrats for promoting gay rights instead of traditional marriage. They savaged Democrats for promoting abortion, which kills 400,000 black babies each year, and which two-thirds of Hispanics oppose.

"You mustn't run these ads," we were told. "Minorities are not moral sexually."

We trumpeted tax issues. Our ads praised the president's family-friendly tax cuts, and assaulted the Democrats for opposing them.

"Minorities want government programs, not tax cuts," our consultant friends told us.

We highlighted investor issues. Herman Cain of America's PAC explained how the current Social Security system discriminates against African Americans demographically, and how private accounts could help minorities accumulate capital for retirement.

"Minorities don't have financial assets," we were told.

We addressed national security. Why, our commercials asked, were Democrats attacking the millions of African-American and Hispanic servicemen who protected our nation from cold-blooded savages committed to killing us?

"Blacks and Hispanics hate the war," intoned the consultants.

We aggressively championed school choice, excoriating black Democratic leaders for practicing it themselves while denying their peers the same option.

"Vouchers are no longer popular among minorities," the pollsters advised.

Early polling presaged our Election Day success. The Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies surveyed 850 African Americans between September 15 and October 10, 2004. Its report, "Politics and the 2004 Election," summarized a conservative shift in black politics. From October 2000 to October 2004, the percentage of African Americans who self-identified as Republicans increased from 4 percent to 10 percent. The percentage of blacks with household incomes of $60,000 or greater who supported Bush increased from 7.7 percent to 22.4 percent. The percentage of self-described black Christian conservatives planning to vote for Bush rose from 11 percent to 36 percent.

To laborers in this vineyard, these changes were dramatic--but understandable. Among non-black, non-Hispanic demographic subgroups, higher levels of religious observance correlated with higher levels of Republican allegiance. And why not? It was Republicans, not Democrats, who promoted the role of religion in the public square. Among non-black, non-Hispanic demographic subgroups, rising income correlated with higher levels of Republican allegiance. And why not? It was the Republicans, not the Democrats, who resisted tax progressivity, and who sheltered income for savings and investment.

The theory of minority exceptionalism posited that the historical experience of minorities was dramatically removed from the mainstream--so much so that even as they assimilated into normative trends of income, residency, occupation, and religiosity, their political behavior would remain apart, responding to culture rather than class. And as late as 2000, that theory seemed credible, at least to GOP consultants.