Did You Say 'American Imperialism'? : Power, weakness, and choices in the Middle East - America's Middle East policies, dating from the end of the Persian Gulf War

National Review, Dec 17, 2001 by Bernard Lewis

In February 1991, as the defeated and shattered forces of Saddam Hussein were fleeing back into Iraq, the military commanders and political leaders of the victorious coalition faced a number of choices. One of these was to pursue and destroy Saddam's Republican Guard, the main prop of the regime. This, some argued at the time, could be done quickly and would enable the Iraqi people and perhaps even much of the Iraqi army to rise against Saddam and overthrow the regime. Others, more cautious, believed that to achieve any real change it would be necessary to advance on Baghdad, occupy the capital, and preside over the installing of a friendly regime. Opponents of this policy argued that such a regime would require continuing support-a military presence, at least for a while, and an ambassador with vice-regal authority. This, they said, would be the imperial method, as used by the British and French, and more recently, in a much harsher form, by the Russians and the Chinese. But the imperial way was not the way of the Americans, who lacked the desire-and some would add the skills-for such a policy.

President Bush decided to end hostilities after a hundred hours on the ground. Like the Israel-Arab Six Day War of 1967, this war was concluded without the occupation of an enemy capital or the overthrow of an enemy regime. America's war aims had been accomplished. They included the liberation of Kuwait from foreign occupation and of Saudi Arabia from the threat of invasion. They did not include the liberation of Iraq from domestic tyranny.

In the Kurdish area adjoining the Turkish frontier, however, the United States joined in establishing a "safe haven" to protect the Kurds from Saddam Hussein's vengeance and the neighbors from an influx of refugees. A couple of years later, the Kurdish factions briefly joined forces and, under the leadership of the Iraqi National Congress, the democratic opposition, sought some American indication of sympathy for their proposal to establish a provisional government of Iraq in the zone.

They received neither encouragement nor support. The scheme had some merit, and there were many indications that the Iraqi National Congress could draw on broad national support-including much of the military-in establishing a free Iraq.

But it did not happen. The Kurdish factions, because of American indecision, resumed their quarreling, making the position of the Iraqi democratic opposition increasingly difficult and the government of the United States increasingly reluctant to become involved. Such an involvement, again, would have been the imperial way-and was therefore unacceptable, above all to the Americans themselves. Rather than risk the possibility of having to station a garrison in Iraq, the administration preferred what it seemed at the time a smaller and simpler option: to leave Iraq to Saddam Hussein, and to station troops in Saudi Arabia, at the invitation of the rulers of that country, to protect them from a renewed Iraqi attack.

'INFIDELS' ON 'HOLY' LAND

This simpler option brought unforeseen complications. For Christians and Jews, the term "Holy Land" refers to the country that has been known, at various stages in its history, as Canaan, Israel, Judea, and Palestine, in which the early formative events of Jewish and Christian history took place. For Muslims, some of these events have some importance, but the true "Holy Land" is Arabia, where the Prophet Muhammad was born, lived and died, and promulgated the Koran. During the great days of the British Empire, the British nibbled at the edges of Arabia-Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Aden-but took care not to land troops on the holy soil of the Prophet's homeland. The presence of American oilmen was accepted, however reluctantly, because they were necessary, for a while at least, to extract and market the oil. The presence of American troops-even by invitation, even to defend the Saudis against aggression-was more difficult to swallow, and was the first and main casus belli in Osama bin Laden's declaration of war against the United States. Osama bin Laden and his followers define the American enemy not as imperialists but as Crusaders (an earlier offender). They have no objection to imperial domination as such, provided that it is the true believers who rule the unbelievers, and not the reverse. This was what happened a thousand years ago, when the Abbasid caliphs in Baghdad ruled a vast and expanding empire, and five hundred years ago, when the Ottoman sultans in Constantinople took over the leadership of Islam and seemed ready to incorporate Europe in their imperial domains. Now the leadership of Christendom has passed from Europe to America, and for Osama bin Laden, as emerges clearly from his writings and utterances, the important point about American imperialism is that it is in decline, and due to share the fate of Rome and Byzantium.

Imperial rule, from the days of the Romans to that of the Soviets, may bring peace and order-the classical prototype is the Pax Romana-but at the price of foreign domination. At the present time, this is a deal in which neither side, American or Middle Eastern, has declared any interest. The foreign policy of the United States, like that of any other sovereign state, is-one presumes-primarily concerned with the defense and advancement of national interests, and for most Americans there are only two such in the Middle East: the supply of oil and the survival of Israel. The survival of Israel can be left to the Israelis, who request financial and some technological help, but not military support. The supply of oil is a more complex business. Some argue that whoever controls the oil will have to sell it and that we need not therefore concern ourselves with regional political squabbles. Some, while recognizing that such squabbles might endanger the supply, nevertheless maintain that since other countries-notably in Europe and the Far East-consume a far larger proportion of Middle Eastern oil than does the United States, it is their responsibility to maintain order. There is however some doubt whether they have the will or the power to discharge this responsibility. The prevailing view is that only the United States is able to maintain political stability in the oil-producing countries and, in particular, to prevent the monopolization of Middle Eastern oil by an aggressive dictator. This, it is argued, requires the protection of existing regimes, at least from external attack.