Iraq reborn: what our troops have wrought, and how to preserve it

IN the final days of 2006, Iraq seemed like a lost cause. The second of two U.S. security crackdowns in Baghdad had failed, with insurgents moving back into "cleared" neighborhoods as soon as thinly stretched U.S. battalions moved on to the next fight. At the same time, the Shiite religious militia Jaish al-Mahdi, whose enemies include both al-Qaeda and the U.S., was steadily moving west across the city, battling al-Qaeda and other Sunni insurgents along the way. Civilian deaths due to the attendant sectarian cleansing reached their highest levels ever. Amid all this, Iranian-built bombs were killing a steeply growing number of soldiers. The prospects of the U.S. military mission in Iraq appeared bleak.

Today, after a momentous year, those trends have been reversed. The U.S. military is prosecuting a sophisticated campaign that bears little resemblance to the struggle it was losing a year ago. We have not won, by any means, but after a troop increase, several aggressive and carefully planned counterinsurgency operations, and a campaign to build tribal support, it seems that we are over the hump. U.S. and Iraqi casualty levels have decreased dramatically; the advance of the Jaish al-Mahdi through Baghdad has stalled; the flow of Iranian bombs has ebbed; and al-Qaeda, while active, is reeling in the wake of blows by U.S. forces and desertions among its former Sunni allies. Security in Iraq remains poor, but as a result of U.S. operations, it is worlds better than it was a year ago.

The reversal of the downward security spiral this past year is largely the result of four interconnected efforts: the "surge" of additional forces into the country; the adoption of classic counterinsurgency tactics, with U.S. battalions spreading out among the population and earning their trust; the grassroots reconciliation of many Sunni and some Shiite communities; and a series of meticulously planned corps-level offensives across Baghdad and its surrounding areas. All of these efforts have hinged on one major change: During 2007, every echelon of the U.S. command--from the four-star headquarters down through the critical corps and division levels to the brigades and battalions in the field--was closely integrated into a cohesive whole. Without this integration, none of the four efforts that have brought Iraq forward would have made much difference.

We all know, from a year of ceaseless media attention, that Gen. David Petraeus is the intellectual heavyweight behind the new military counterinsurgency doctrine, but a number of other changes were needed to make possible that doctrine's success. The first and highest-level of these, of course, was President Bush's announcement shortly before his 2007 State of the Union address that five additional brigades would be "surged" into Iraq. Although it would take six months for the full complement of surge units to be in place, the announcement made clear that the White House and the Pentagon were giving the new commander a blank slate to alter the force and its strategy, operations, and tactics. The importance of this fresh-start mentality should not be underestimated; it not only allowed Petraeus unprecedented freedom of action as he assumed command, but also signaled to Iraqis--friend and foe alike--that, no matter what the polls showed, the United States was deeply committed to Iraq, at least for one more year.

What to do, though, with the surge brigades and this freedom of action? Soon after the president's address, Petraeus and his civilian counterpart, Amb. Ryan Crocker, gathered a team of well-regarded officers, including Cols. H. R. McMaster, Peter Mansoor, and Bill Rapp. This team drew up a campaign plan that incorporated creative counterinsurgency solutions at all levels, with an emphasis on getting fighters out into hostile areas, keeping them there, and following up on their successes. One key innovation was the formation of a "strategic engagement cell" to lead reconciliation efforts with former insurgents. Another was the relentless emphasis on pushing combat units off the large bases from which they had "commuted to combat" in 2006, and onto outposts from which they could secure the population.

The new strategy also included major operational and tactical shifts at every echelon of command. Collectively, these are often called the "Petraeus Doctrine," but the officers below him deserve just as much credit. Indeed, giving lower-level generals and colonels the freedom to innovate was itself one of the most important parts of the doctrine.

A STRATEGY AND ITS TACTICS

In December 2006, Lt. Gen. Raymond Odierno arrived in Iraq to take command of Multi-National Corps Iraq (MNC-I), which is responsible for overseeing the war at an operational level--deciding which brigades are sent where, and how the different area commands will interact with each other. As a two-star commander in northern Iraq in 2003, Odierno had been harshly criticized in the press for heavy-handed tactics, and many observers greeted his assumption of the new post with trepidation. In the past year, however, Odierno has proved to be the finest corps commander of the war.