Perils of 'Empire'

National Review, Feb 24, 2003 by John Hillen

American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy, by Andrew J. Bacevich (Harvard, 320 pp., $29.95)

In reading the Federalist Papers, one becomes acutely aware of how much their authors felt they were attempting to outrun history's shadow. Madison's Federalist 10 in particular strains, through one line of argument after another, to convince the reader that this proposed republic will outrun the reasons that brought all others to ruin. The new government would be nothing less than a one-time escapee from the inevitable sorry fate of all republics.

Today's United States could use a similar effort for its empire. That it recognizes it has one is not in doubt. The National Security Strategy signed by President Bush last year boldly states that America has universal answers (there is "a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise"), intends to spread this gospel ("we will actively work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world"), and will brook no resistance ("our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military buildup"). A landmark Bush speech at West Point last June left no doubt that this empire would attack those threatening its citizens, its order, its prosperity, or the spread of its ideals. This was not the shining city on the hill as exemplar only; this was a vengeful and purposeful power.

But beyond the bare fact that we have an empire, there is-so far-not much substance to it: The National Security Strategy is declarative, but not operational. The principles of the empire have been articulated, but the strategy for carrying them out remains unclear. Important questions about the character and structure of our institutions, leaders, and allies need to be asked before we can be confident that this particular empire can stymie history and beat the foreseeable cycle of blowback and resistance, imperial overstretch, internal decline, and balancing powers.

Andrew J. Bacevich, a former Army officer and now professor of international relations at Boston University, puts us on the road to answering these questions in his timely and intelligent book American Empire. The ambitions of the book are not large; the author seeks chiefly to present a critical explanation for American statecraft in the 1990s. In that effort, Bacevich usefully frames the new imperial challenges in the context of American diplomatic history-and reminds the reader that the dominant narrative of America as a reluctant superpower is a myth. The U.S. has been on a long, if fitful, quest for an "open world" underpinned by America's own might. The global order pursued in one fashion or another by administrations over the past hundred-odd years is framed by democratic pluralism as the political norm, free-market capitalism as the economic standard, technical advancement as an undeniable creed, and a consumerist-based culture as the last word in social custom. Bacevich makes a persuasive case that this imperium has been our "policy by default" since the end of the Cold War, with the differences between Clinton and the two Bushes being principally tactical.

Indeed, the precepts of the American empire are hardly debated by serious political folk. No presidential candidate would now gainsay the following chain of logic: that robust and continued economic growth is an imperative for the U.S.; that the U.S. market alone is insufficient to sustain the necessary level of growth; that a well-ordered and generally peaceful international setting (i.e., democratic, capitalist, and consumerist) is therefore essential; and that the duty of an American political leader is to wield U.S. power and influence to preserve these conditions more or less worldwide. One candidate may emphasize human rights here and another candidate a strong military there, but as Bacevich details, "to a greater extent than any other factor, the pursuit of [global] openness defines the essential azimuth of U.S. policy, a course set more than a century ago and followed ever since."

Many other countries, of course, desire much the same result-but none has the iconic presence or sheer power of the U.S. In attempting to shape this basic condition of the world, the best any other state can hope for is to box a bit above its weight (the strategy of Britain and France) or use crisis-based trump cards well (as Russia and Pakistan did after 9/11). But the U.S. has a smorgasbord of real choices in how it pursues the strategy of openness, precisely because its preponderance of power is so overwhelming. A full and readily deployable suite of diplomatic, military, economic, technological, and cultural tools means that very real differences will emerge over exactly how to rule and govern this empire. We should begin to see many more operational debates like the current one over the balance between unilateral and multilateral approaches to coalition leadership on Iraq.