On the Right

National Review, April 7, 2003 by William F. Buckley, Jr.

POTUS with The Press

NEW YORK, MARCH 7

A post-post-mortem on President Bush's press conference, conducted with a friend who has been intimately involved in the past, reminds us that what's important to every president is to get said what he wants to say. "Twist your answer to the question around to what you want to get out," my informant summarized his experiences with one president; and of course the device, one or another form of the non sequitur, is applicable in non-presidential affairs. In presidential press conferences there is no immediate opportunity to do this except after the fact, and the broader listening public tends not to care. Restive listeners to a presidential press conference are entitled to wonder, if they are left squirming, why the press conference forum was selected, the president having always the alternative of simply making a statement or giving a speech.

Mr. President -- one reporter asked -- Secretary Powell has said that we have shared with our allies all the current up-to-date intelligence information on the imminence of the threat we face from Saddam Hussein. That being so, how do you account for "their reluctance to think the threat is so real, so imminent?"

The president handled that question by not answering it. His evening's inventory, drawn on repeatedly during the conference, was that Hussein was a threat, was not disarming, had been given twelve years to disarm; that his failure to do so activated the president's supreme responsibility, which is to look after the security of the American people.

All of the above is correct, but leaves entirely unanswered why Germany and France are less concerned for security than the United States. Don't say anything, Mr. President, critical of our allies! One can hear the warning stressed at the dress rehearsal, and indeed it is entirely understandable that a president should avoid unnecessary provocations. What would he be expected to say, for heaven's sake? That the leaders of Germany and France are delinquent civil officials? That they are is immaterial in the world of public presidential affairs. So . . . you don't answer the question of a reporter. Are you arguing you should satisfy the reporter and antagonize President Chirac and Chancellor Schroeder?

The president had a terrible time on the matter of the United Nations. The reporter wanted to know whether President Bush would be "defiant of the United Nations if you went ahead with military action without specific authorization of the U.N.?" The only answer to that is: Yes.

What we got was that it was Mr. Bush who took the issue to the U.N. in September of 2002; that he wants the U.N. to be effective; that it's important for it to be a "robust, capable body"; and where our security is involved, we "really don't need the United Nations' approval." The president reminded the reporters that there had been skepticism about the U.N. last fall but that when it came to a vote, Resolution 1441 was passed unanimously by the Security Council. He expressed the hope that the U.N. would, when it came down to it, concur with the new resolution.

But Mr. Bush revealed a true humility in telling the world that he sought guidance from the Almighty, and his professed gratitude for spiritual support was arresting. "It's a humbling experience to think that people I will never have met have lifted me and my family up in prayer. And for that I'm grateful. That's . . . it's been a comforting feeling to know that is true. I pray for peace."

That exposure to George W. Bush was the only harvest of the press conference, and justified the hour.

The New World Immediately Ahead

NEW YORK, MARCH 11

The Iraqi question is bringing about a change in perspectives at a screeching speed. Conventions we have lived by and plighted our troths to are simply emptying out, lacking in muscle, or spirit. The first of these, manifestly, is the United Nations as an instrument for guarding the peace.

The U.N. is finally suffering from the imposture of its constitution. When it was formed in 1945 it needed two things, without which nothing at all could be done in creating an institution with political authority. It had to have the Soviet Union and the United States as members, participating with equal authority. Thus both powers got the veto. It was then given to the other three victorious powers: China, Britain, and France.

That was 58 years ago and nobody plausibly asks that continued fruits of victory should go on any longer. Their contributions to victory in 1945 were made before 80 percent of the world's population was born. On Monday, the French foreign minister pledged quite directly to veto any resolution that could be interpreted as authorizing the use of military force in Iraq any time before the next French grape harvest. The question then became a simple political one: Did the U.N. have the strength to deter the United States?

Since the answer to that is plainly No, then we explore deductions. The primary one of these is that the U.N. has forever lost its hypothetical authority. De facto, it was lost when we proceeded against Kosovo in 1999 without authority. De jure, we are about to lose it because unlike in 1999, when we simply did it and nobody drew down a veto, this time the veto will be there and we'll do it anyway. An analogy was President Andrew Jackson's challenge of 1830: "John Marshall has made his decision. Let him now enforce it if he can." Somebody had to prevail, the executive or the judiciary.