Iran's Supplier . . . and our new ally: The problem of Russia - Russia's arms deals with Iran are potential problem for U.S

National Review, April 22, 2002 by Richard Lowry

What's the difference between "most likely" and "probably"? It may not seem like much, but in the precisely expressed National Intelligence Estimate -- an occasional summary of the work of U.S. intelligence agencies -- it can mean a lot. In 1999, the estimate said that the U.S. would "most likely" face a missile threat from North Korea, would "probably" face one from Iran, and would "possibly" face one from Iraq, all in the next 15 years. In March, CIA official Robert Walpole told Congress that Iran had caught up to North Korea and joined it in the "most likely" category -- a quantum jump in Iran's potential threat to the U.S.

Walpole wouldn't say in his open testimony what accounted for Iran's overachieving, but it isn't particularly hard to guess one reason. The Iranian missile program might as well be stamped "From Russia, with love." A week after Walpole's testimony, CIA director George Tenet told Congress that Russia is the "first choice" of rogue states "seeking the most advanced technology and training." According to Tenet, "Russia continues to supply significant assistance on nearly all aspects of Tehran's nuclear program. It is also providing Iran assistance on long- range ballistic-missile programs."

In other words, Russia is conspiring with Iran to create perhaps the most dire looming missile and nuclear threat to the United States and its allies. Everything that the U.S. has said recently about Iraq and weapons of mass destruction applies with equal -- perhaps more -- force to Iran, a larger country than Iraq that is more directly involved in terrorism. Since Sept. 11, it has been a commonplace to say Russia has "joined the West." Maybe it has, but if so, it is on the model of West Germany in the 1980s, which blissfully provided the assistance necessary for Iraq to come close to a nuclear capability by the time of the Persian Gulf War in 1991.

Russia's role as the supplier of choice to a charter member of the "axis of evil" should no longer be an afterthought in the U.S.-Russia relationship. Instead, the U.S. should use the considerable diplomatic and economic tools at its disposal to convince the Russians to pull back on their weapons assistance to Tehran. But between Russian intransigence as a matter of policy and the difficulty of controlling the renegade Russian military-industrial establishment as a matter of practice, Iran's weapons drive may be unstoppable. Ultimately, the U.S. needs to think in terms, not just of preventing, but of defending against and possibly preempting the Iranian threat.

According to Walpole, Iran is likely to "establish a technical base from which it could develop ICBMs or intermediate-range ballistic missiles, capable of delivering nuclear weapons to Western Europe and the United States." All U.S. intelligence agencies think Iran could possibly attempt to build an ICBM by about mid decade, and could have a nuclear weapon by the end of the decade. (The Israeli assessment is more dire, estimating that Iran will have a nuclear capability by 2005.) But these timelines could be shortened with significant foreign assistance.

Enter Russia. Iranian officials seemed to spend most of 2001 signing arms agreements with the Russians, inking deals worth several billion dollars. Russian assistance hurried the development of Iran's current medium-range missile arsenal. And Tehran couldn't develop the longer- range missiles it now seeks -- the already-tested Shahab-3, capable of reaching Israel, Turkey, and Egypt, and more advanced follow-ons perhaps capable of reaching the U.S. -- without North Korean and Russian help. Meanwhile, Iran has an $800 million contract with Russia to build a light-water nuclear reactor in Bushehr.

Since Russia and Iran have traditionally not been cozy, this seems an unlikely relationship. But, as Ariel Cohen of the Heritage Foundation says, "proliferation makes strange bedfellows." Iran is one of the most important sources of cash for the Russian defense industry. And for the old Cold Warriors in the Russian security establishment, anything that increases the power of enemies of the United States is a good thing. Also, Iran has helpfully minimized its complaints about Russia's brutal campaign against Muslim separatists in Chechnya. Finally, Russia has -- perhaps short-sightedly -- never been as uptight about proliferation as the U.S., and defends Iran's right to "peaceful" atomic power.

"Peaceful" atomic power, however, is a chimera. A nuclear bomb technically isn't that difficult to build. The key is acquiring the necessary fissile material. Iran could try to steal it or buy it on the black market, or simply make its own. The Bushehr reactor is scheduled to be finished by 2003. Russia says it will take back from Iran the reactor's plutonium-laden spent fuel, but there's no guarantee that Iran won't divert the plutonium to its own purposes.

Russia has so far been mostly unmoved by U.S. complaints over Bushehr. It argues that if it stops building the plant, a European country will only fill the breach. There's something to be said for this argument, unfortunately. Russia can also point to the uncomfortable fact that the United States itself has agreed to build not just one, but two light- water reactors for North Korea, as part of a deal Pyongyang extorted from the Clinton administration.