Don Rumsfeld, Radical for our Time: The defense secretary has ushered in a new era, whose contours we have barely glimpsed

National Review, May 5, 2003 by Victor Davis Hanson

The Taliban defeated without American infantry, and at a cost of fewer than ten U.S. fatalities? Ten thousand Special Operations troops turned loose to work independently in northern Iraq? Not one traditional armored division on the ground near Baghdad? Thousands of GIs rumored soon to be redeployed out of Germany? Troops in the DMZ eyeing transfer southward to Pusan? Past draftees characterized as not as effective as present volunteer professionals? A secretary of defense going head-to- head with seasoned and cynical Washington reporters -- and coming off as their moral and intellectual superior?

These are all aspects of the same fundamental question: What exactly is going on with the American military? Not since secretary of war Edwin M. Stanton poked his head into every department of the Union Army and Robert McNamara tried to apply corporate business procedures to the Pentagon bureaucracy has a U.S. official exercised such political and military influence as Donald Rumsfeld. But while Stanton was politically inept and McNamara failed at war, so far -- 27 months into his tenure -- Rumsfeld is showing every sign of success. At home, he is steamrolling angry generals and balky diplomats; on the battlefield, he has crushed the Taliban and Saddam Hussein.

But what exactly is Rumsfeld's vision for the future of the U.S. military? The public is unsure, because an array of critics -- out of either self-interest or simple ignorance -- has caricatured his attempt to reform the armed forces. Their reservoir of ill-will broke out into hysteria during the race to Baghdad, when a pause in fighting -- occasioned by horrendous weather conditions and necessary resupply efforts -- touched off an eruption of anti-Rumsfeld rhetoric among a few retired generals who had found employment as TV pontificators. Before 9/11, Rumsfeld's efforts to refashion the American military were largely ignored; but they are now being showcased on the world stage, and will be judged on their effectiveness.

One key Rumsfeld accomplishment is devising a new role for the Army. It is a serious mistake to suggest, as some have, that Rumsfeld favors the Navy, Air Force, and Marines; in fact, his reforms will probably enhance the Army's ground forces. His approach has already paid off in the Iraq war: The Army's Special Forces, 101st and 82nd Airborne Divisions, and 3rd Mechanized Division played a crucial role in the victory. (It was not Rumsfeld but the Turks who thwarted the efforts to open a northern front with at least two more Army divisions. And the 4th Infantry Division has arrived in Iraq on plan and on time, not -- as some assert -- because of a desperate call-up.)

But while the Army's Bradley fighting vehicles and Abrams tanks were vital in smashing Iraqi defenses and preventing Mogadishu-like nightmares, other things were equally important: the speeding motorized convoys that bypassed initial resistance; the air drops; the irregulars who organized the Kurds; and the small squads of highly trained skirmishers who proved masterful house-to-house fighters. In other words, Rumsfeld's plan was creative and successful: Rather than send out tens of thousands of traditional soldiers behind a wall of armor -- which would have been a logistical nightmare, requiring perhaps a year or more to assemble in a vulnerable, confined place -- Rumsfeld allowed the Army to undertake new responsibilities well beyond its traditional role. The Army has been on the cutting edge in mobilizing and deploying the indigenous forces that have been critically important in our recent Middle East wars. Furthermore, thanks to instantaneous electronic communications between ground forces and pilots, the new Army is not replaced by, but rather essential to, successful air operations.

There remains a need for traditional armored and infantry divisions, but not in the old numbers required to fight two traditional wars simultaneously against Soviet-style ground forces. We would surely need tons of steel and shells to stop a North Korea-style onslaught; but to ensure that such a war is not lost at its very beginning, we will need lighter, more mobile forces that can be rushed to hot spots until the heavy muscle arrives.

In a few months, analysts will begin to appreciate the true audacity of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The Army had access to firepower to a degree never before seen. No tactician has yet quite figured out the force- multiplying effect of quickly achieved air superiority, GPS-guided munitions, and on-the-ground spotters; but surely the destructive power of A-10 fighters, helicopters, and carrier- and land-based bombers that were in service to small Army tactical units was worth the equivalent of 1,000 tanks. Furthermore, the operation took a number of -- successful -- tactical risks to satisfy myriad political objectives. For example, long, vulnerable supply lines made it possible for U.S. forces to advance rapidly to Baghdad, and thus take momentum away from a growing global antiwar movement; and the dearth of pre-battle bombing ensured a relatively sound infrastructure for rebuilding.