Weather-vane politics - Bill Clinton's politically motivated policies for Haiti - Editorial

National Review, May 30, 1994

PRESIDENT Clinton's "new policy" regarding Haiti is one part weakness, one part cynical politics. Reacting to a hunger strike by activist Randall Robinson and to criticism from the Black Caucus, Mr. Clinton announced harsher economic sanctions on Haiti and weaker controls on would-be Haitian immigrants. He fired the career diplomat who was Haiti coordinator and replaced him with the retired black congressman William Gray.

The political result is what Mr. Clinton wanted: Mr. Robinson called off his hunger strike, and, for the moment, the Left is warily saying the Administration's Haiti policy is "moving in the right direction." And it appears that politics is, still, all the White House cares about. Bill Gray has little foreign-policy experience and no familiarity with Haiti. In fact he has nothing to recommend him for this new job except his presumed ability to keep the Black Caucus quiet; but that is his real assignment.

It is predictable how Haitians will react. The military, seeing Mr. Clinton wilt before a hunger strike, will not be terrified by his additional threats against them. Exiled President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, newly embraced by an Administration that is afraid of critics on its Left, will be even less inclined to compromise. On the ground in Haiti, the tougher embargo will make life even more difficult for the poor, and the immigration-policy changes will seem to open the door to America a bit wider. The result will be more emigration.

It is obvious, then, that Mr. Clinton's "new policy" is a quick fix, not a solution. It might at best gain the President a few months, as Mr. Gray wards off critics and the new immigration procedures are tried. But if American law is properly enforced, the Immigration Service will find what it has always found: over 90 per cent of Haitians are economic migrants, not political refugees. This will present the President with another choice: return the others to Haiti, spurring new protests, or let them all stay in the United States, which means losing Florida in November. Instead of confronting the Haiti conundrum in May, then, the President might be able to postpone doing so until late summer or the fall.

The truly cynical will note that summer is the good weather season, when small boats are most likely to make it from Haiti to Florida. If Mr. Clinton can get by with returning Haitians during this period, he will have passed the point of maximum danger of mass migration. And Mr. Gray's contract is for 130 days, neatly carrying him into the hurricane season, when weather, not American law, will keep Haitians at home.

Most likely, it will not work. Boat builders on Haiti's coasts are hard at it, and by early June migration levels will be much higher. Then Mr. Clinton will have to face reality once again, and either turn away from Father Aristide or use American troops to bring him home and enforce his writ.

But this respite can be used to advantage. Congress should tell Mr. Clinton to forget using American soldiers as Aristide's private army. We do not face a national-security problem in Haiti, and the use of American military forces to solve Mr. Clinton's political difficulties should be stopped cold.