Poland and NATO

National Review, June 3, 1996 by David D. Hale, Anna Hejka-Arczynska

As the rising star of Central Europe, Poland may soon offer NATO more than just a new Western front.

THE issue of NATO membership for the Central European countries, and especially Poland, is likely to heat up this summer, chiefly because of two presidential elections -- Russia's in June, and America's in November. There are over nine million people of Polish ancestry in the United States, and many of them are clustered in the six Great Lakes states, which have about one hundred electoral votes. Most political leaders in both the U.S. and Europe have already expressed sympathy for Polish membership in NATO, but they have not focused on the cost of providing Poland with a security guarantee or the complications that Polish membership could create for Amerizca's relations with Russia. Both issues could become far more challenging if the Communist Party regains control of the Russian presidency from Boris Yeltsin.

It is doubtful that the Communist candidate, Gennady Zyuganov, or any other post-Yeltsin leader would pose an immediate threat to Central Europe. The Russian military is probably weaker today than at any other time since 1917, and the major foreign-policy focus of any Russian government will be the countries of the former Soviet Union, not the Warsaw Pact. But the election of a Communist or nationalist government in Moscow could have several adverse effects on Central Europe.

First, it might cause international investors to be more cautious about deploying capital to the region and thus retard the promising economic upturns in Poland, the Czech Republic, and, especially, Hungary.

Second, it might encourage capital flight on the part of the Poles, Czechs, and Hungarians themselves. All three countries are moving toward membership in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and thus will have to relax their foreign-exchange controls. As a result of their historical experience with Russia, the affluent classes in all three countries will be very sensitive to political developments there.

The Poles will be especially apprehensive because of their long, tortured relationship with Russia. Poland is the leading Catholic country in the Slavic world, while Russia's historical roots lie in Byzantium. The two countries were rivals during the Middle Ages, and a Polish army occupied Moscow in the early seventeenth century. However, feudal conflicts within Poland's unique system of elective kingship undermined Poland's power, and it became de facto a Russian protectorate in 1717. Russia played a decisive role in the three partitions that eliminated the country's independence in the late eighteenth century. Lenin fought a three-year war with Poland after the country regained independence in 1918. Stalin set the stage for Poland's second liquidation in 1939 by signing the Molotov - Ribbentrop pact with Hitler, and established a Communist regime in Warsaw when the war ended.

Third, as the countries of Central Europe still have large numbers of ex-Communists in positions of power, uncertainty about Russian foreign-policy intentions could provoke new concerns about the loyalty of important local political and business leaders. Such concerns will be a distraction both from economic development and from the creation of healthy institutions.

Finally, if the Central European countries are uncertain about their security position, they might be tempted to pursue alliances with Ukraine and the Baltic states. Poland has already encouraged Ukraine to retain its nuclear weapons. If Russia threatened the sovereignty of Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltic states, it would not be difficult to imagine Polish nationalist groups offering them covert military assistance. The best way for NATO to minimize the potential involvement of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary in conflicts on their eastern frontier would be to integrate them into the Western security system.

The debate about NATO expansion focuses on Poland because she has the potential to alter the balance of power in Europe in ways the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia do not. So far, the discussion has focused only on the potential costs to existing NATO members. But the debate should also take account of Poland's tremendous economic progress since the fall of Communism and its potential to emerge as one of Europe's most dynamic countries during the next quarter-century. As a result of economic and demographic trends, it is not difficult to construct scenarios in which Poland could become a highly valuable member of the NATO alliance in the twenty-first century.

First, Poland has a land area of 120,727 square miles, making it nearly as big as Germany. Its population, currently 39 million, will soon place it seventh in Europe after Russia, Germany, Britain, France, Italy, and Ukraine. Poland, still 95 per cent Catholic, also has a much younger population than most other European countries.

In the early 1980s, Poland's birth rate was 2.4 per cent, compared to 1.0 to 1.4 per cent in much of continental Europe and 1.8 per cent in the United States. The Polish birth rate has fallen to less than 2.0 per cent since 1989 because of the social shocks resulting from the transition to a market economy, but the birth rate could revive as people regain confidence in the economic outlook. If we extrapolate from current trends, Poland will continue to have a much younger population than other European countries far into the next century -- a total population of 43 million in the year 2050, with 34.8 million people under the age of 65.