Requiem for a policy - failure of US foreign policy in Bosnia to support air strikes against Serbs and armaments for Muslims - Editorial

In early February, Secretary of State Warren Christopher announced an ambitious policy of stopping aggression and rectifying injustice in Bosnia. The economic and diplomatic means that he prescribed, alas, were inadequate and thus were doomed to fail. Three months later, Serb defiance had proved the point. After much soul-searching the Administration came up with two stronger options - providing arms to those resisting aggression, and launching limited U.S. air strikes against Serb artillery.

The President sent Mr. Christopher - an avowed opponent of stronger measures - to Europe to convince recalcitrant allies. The result was a humiliating rebuff. The visible collapse of American policy then emboldened the Bosnian Serbs, who voted in their mid-May referendum to reject the compromise concocted earlier by Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen.

There are many losers here. First, the innocents of Bosnia, who are subjected to continuing Serb aggression. Second, the North Atlantic Alliance, paralyzed by its disagreements and riven by mutual recriminations. Third, American leadership, as our relevance to Europe's continuing crisis fades (exacerbated by the Administration's plans for drastic troop cuts).

But the Europeans' performance is particularly disgraceful. Having sent their own troops to Bosnia without a strategy, they have alternated between begging the United States for help and rebuffing U.S. proposals for intervention. The British and French Foreign Offices seem content to maintain their forces in a feeble UN-relief-convoy role until a new status quo is ratified by events, consolidating Serb gains. Indeed, the only logic we can discern in their policy is the cold calculation that since the Serbs will win in the end, they had best win quickly. Hence the fierceness, otherwise inexplicable, of their opposition to ending the arms embargo.

What should American policy be in these circumstances? The U.S. has nothing vital at stake in Bosnia - but it has interests there even so: avoiding a wider Balkan war, discouraging Russian "ethnic cleansing" in the new republics (and perhaps in Eastern Europe), and re-establishing American leadership across the Atlantic. Such considerations, being less than vital, justify only modest risks.

Sending a deterrent force to Macedonia or Kosovo to prevent a spillover into those republics, which is apparently being considered by the Administration, would be a mistake on every count. It would be irrelevant to saving Bosnia, but perhaps start a drift toward wider involvement by U.S. ground troops.

We remain vehemently opposed to sending U. S. ground troops anywhere in the former Yugoslavia. The Administration is on record as endorsing such a move, to help police a Vance-Owen-type settlement if the Serbs should ever stand down (or be satiated). Not only would it be a bloody mess, but it could put us in the position of enforcing an unjust status quo against Muslim and Croatian attempts to reverse Serb gains. We would go in as everybody's friend and depart as everybody's enemy. That degree of humiliation the United States need not risk, even under this Administration.

But there are policies offering the possibility of success at much less risk. Serb forces in Bosnia are losing men through desertions; Muslim forces have fought hard, giving way only when they have run out of ammunition. Arming the Bosnians and striking tactical targets from the air would have a good chance of turning the tide. The main danger would lie in carrying out these measures in so limited a fashion as to drain them of all effectiveness. More drastic measures against Serbia should therefore be held in reserve. The Administration could have rallied European support in support of such an approach if it were truly determined. It could still.