Parlaying the summit - how Moscow Summit may help George Bush

National Review, July 8, 1988 by John McLaughlin

PARLAYING THE SUMMIT

FOR ALL the questions swirling around Ronald Reagan's performance at the Moscow Summit, judged from a PR point of view it can only help his understudy, George Bush. Recent head-to-head polls measuring Bush against Dukakis give the Masachusetts governor better than a 15-point lead. But on foreign-policy issues--namely, depth of experience in dealing with foreign leaders, ability to handle relations with the Soviets, and knowledgeability about top-level defense questions -- Bush heavily outweighs Dukakis.

The Veep's strengths in these areas are partly the result of his career experience: combat veteran, CIA director, envoy to China, Vice President. But they are also traditional GOP strengths. Asked whether Republicans or Democrats can better handle foreign policy and defense, voters habitually give an edge to the GOP. This Republican strength has attracted conservative, blue-collar Democrats to the GOP ticket in recent presidential elections, notably Nixon's 1972 landslide and Reagan's 1980 and 1984 wins. However, with Iran-Contra, some of this traditional GOP advantage has dissipated.

In Moscow, Reagan helped change that. The Gipper won one for the Veep. Reagan's virtuoso performance -- e.g., his address at the Moscow State University -- gave Bush the opportunity to turn the presidential campaign back to the question of experience. In a resume contest, Bush beats Dukakis easily -- but he has to get the voters to look at his resume rather than at the Iran-Contra headlines. Reagan's Moscow Momentum may have shown him the way.

However, it is wrong to speak of the Summit purrely in PR terms. In spite of Ronald Reagan's legendary nonchalance as President, he has not been essentially uninvolved in U.S. -- Soviet relations. One facet has particularly engaged his interest throughout his tenure in office -- i.e., the relative strength of the U.S. versus the Soviet economy.

When William Casey was CIA director and William Clark was national security advisor, Reagan showed great interest in regular reports on Soviet sales of gold reserves. He knew that to sustain military competition with the United States, the Soviets were spending a much higher percentage of their GNP on the military than we were of ours. Depletion of their gold reserves and a lower living standard for average citizens were the price the Soviets paid. For years Reagan has believed that eventually the Soviets would cry uncle, and jettison their policy of military superiority. They have hardly done this, but Reagan still believes they will. That belief was the underpinning of his policy of "peace through strength." Bush should make this his rallying cry, and assert his own determination to continue, guardedly, a policy that brought the Soviets to the bargaining table.

THIS TACTICAL OPENING for Bush can still slam shut if Gorbachev falters at the Communist Party conference later this month, particularly if Politburo hard-liners use the lack of progress on SDI as their excuse for curbing glasnost and perestroika. But most Potomac pundits now rank Gorbachev's chances of prevailing at the conference as better than fifty-fifty. For the Soviets, the Summit legitimized the USSR as a nation among nations -- a clear plus for Gabachev.

The question now is whether Bush's strategists are adroit enough to see the Summit opportunity and exploit it fully. Unfortunately, early indications are negative: Bush's handlers want to separate him too much from Mr. Reagan. And yet the Summit might give the understudy his chance to play the leading role.