Heads in the sand

National Review, July 20, 1992 by Noel Malcolm

Even skeptical European politicians want to keep Maastricht alive. Their constituents have no such agenda.

THE British government was planning an amusing little ceremony for July 1, when it took over the rotating presidency of the European Community. A logo had been devised for Britain's six months in the presidential chair: a lion stepping into the EC's circle of stars. Someone thought it would be a good idea to bring a newborn lion cub to the press conference that day, and have it christened by a Foreign Office minister. Unfortunately, although several pregnant lionesses were located in British zoos, none could be guaranteed to deliver on time. One zoo offered a baby giraffe instead; but the offer was declined.

Foreign Office officials are notorious for their lack of imagination. Abandoning their search for cuddly mammals, they could have settled instead on the perfect symbol for the European Community at this crucial moment in its history: an ostrich with its head in the sand. Alternatively, a headless chicken could have been encouraged to run around in a few circles. For the truth is that, ever since the Danes rejected the Maastricht Treaty on June 2, the atmosphere in the council chambers of the EC has been frantic with indecision. The only consistent policy has been the desperate one of pretending that the Danish vote never happened.

There were no contingency plans. Non-ratification had been unthinkable; at least, it had been unthought. The whole of 1991 had been spent putting together the treaty (which commits the EC to economic and monetary union), and the whole of 1992 was earmarked for ratifying it in each of the 12 member states. Most of the treaty consists of amendments to the original document which set up the EC, the Treaty of Rome: for that reason, it requires unanimous ratification by all the countries that were (or later became) parties to that earlier treaty. If only 11 out of 12 ratify the Maastricht accord, it cannot function as a valid treaty. Without unanimity, it can have no effect whatsoever.

When the people of Ireland voted heavily in favor of the treaty two weeks later, a chorus of European foreigu ministers declared that the Maastricht Treaty was "back on course." But the nautical metaphor was singularly ill-chosen. By voting no, the Danes had not perpetrated some minor navigational error that could be corrected by other voters elsewhere. They had sent the treaty to the bottom of the sea.

What had gone wrong in Denmark? The first error was to allow the Danish people to find out what was in' the treaty. Half a million copies were printed, and they sold out within a week. "It is a mistake to let people see the treaty," said one prominent member of the European Parliament, the French socialist Jean-Pierre Cot; "they will only misunderstand it."

But many Danes seem to have understood it only too well. Their greatest worry was that, with the dismantling of frontiers and the merging of currencies, Denmark would become little more than a province of its giant neighbor, Germany. There were other concerns too: some disliked the idea of a common European defense policy, which might lead one day to their children having to serve in a European army, and others thought the treaty threatened the constitutional position of the Danish monarchy. Some feared that Denmark's high levels of social welfare would be reduced, and some objected to the proposed transfers of money from rich European countries to poor ones--not because they resented helping the poor, but because they preferred their money to go to genuinely poor countries in the Third World, instead of bankrolling inefficient industries in southern Europe.

The range of objections is wide, and it is reflected and amplified in many other EC countries. Generally speaking, objections to Maastricht are a privilege of the richer member states: the poorest members (Greece, Portugal, Ireland) are already dependent on subsidies from Brussels, and are promised even bigger handouts (styled "cohesion funds") under the Maastricht Treaty. The conclusive argument in Ireland was that for every Irish pound paid into the Community's coffers, Ireland receives six in return. But in Germany, the largest net contributor to EC funds, the high cost of membership is turning public opinion against Maastricht. In one recent opinion poll which asked, "Can Germany afford further moves toward European unity?" 75 per cent said no. Even higher percentages have been recorded in Germany against the plan to abandon the Deutsche Mark and create a new European currency--nicknamed "Esperanto money"--instead.

In France, on the other hand, the most popular objection is not to Eurocurrency, but to the treaty's plan for Eurocitizenship, which will entitle non-French nationals to vote in France's local elections. This plan required a change in the French constitution, which was agreed to by a special session of the legislature at Versailles on June 23; but the issue still rankles with French voters, who will have a chance to express their views in a referendum this fall.