Why we need a missile shield - Defense & Technology

National Review, July 31, 1995 by Stephen J. Hadley

THE GULF WAR was a wake-up call for ballistic-missile defense. With Iraq's air force knocked out on the first day, ballistic missiles were the only way it could attack the territory of the nations arrayed against it, especially Saudi Arabia. A single Iraqi ballistic missile accounted for 20 per cent of all U.S. combat fatalities in that war.

Iraq also sent missiles raining down on Israeli cities, in hopes of provoking Israel's entry into the war and the subsequent defection of Arab states unwilling to be part of a coalition including Israel. This strategy undoubtedly would have succeeded had the United States not deployed Patriot missiles to defend Israel. Despite hundreds of sorties, U.S. aircraft simply could not find the mobile launchers from which Iraq launched its missiles. Not a single one was destroyed from the air. Although not designed to defend urban areas, the Patriots were our only available countermeasure, and they knocked down a sufficient number of ballistic missiles to defeat the Iraqi strategy by permitting Israel to stay out of the war.

We could face even more serious threats in the future. By the end of the decade, we could see over 20 countries with ballistic missiles, 9 with nuclear weapons, 10 with biological weapons, and up to 30 with chemical weapons.

The threat presented by ballistic missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction can arise quickly. While it takes a long time to develop such weapons from scratch, they can be easily transferred from a state already possessing them. China has supplied ballistic missiles to Syria and Pakistan. North Korea has offered Libya and Iran its new Nodong I missile with a range of over 600 miles. From those countries a Nodong could reach cities in France, Italy, Greece, and Turkey; from North Korea itself, the missile could reach Japan. North Korea is developing two missiles with ranges that unofficial sources place as exceeding 1,200 and 2,000 miles, respectively. The latter may put cities in Alaska and Hawaii within reach of North Korea.

It is not just that ballistic-missile capability can spread quickly. It is also that hostile states can emerge with little warning. Who would have thought in the fall of 1989 that we would be at war with Iraq just one year later? In 1987, China began delivering its 1,700-mile-range CSS-2 missile to Saudi Arabia. If its current government were replaced by a radical fundamentalist regime, Saudi Arabia could pose a direct threat to Israel.

FORTUNATELY, our nation seems to have learned the lessons of the Gulf War when it comes to defending our overseas troops and our allies against ballistic missiles. A broad consensus supports congressional funding for such theater missile defense (TMD) systems. An upgrade to the Patriot (PAC 3) will enhance protection of critical targets by the late 1990s. A Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system will protect broad geographic areas (including both military forces and cities) after the year 2000. A TMD system on Navy Aegis ships (the Navy Lower Tier) will protect coastal installations and military forces going ashore beginning in the late 1990s. We can dramatically enhance the effectiveness of these systems by placing sensors in space (``Brilliant Eyes'').

But the lessons of the Gulf War have not been learned when it comes to defending the American people at home. Put simply, the United States has no means to defend its own territory against ballistic missiles. The long-range missiles required to fly over the oceans that protect our shores will fly too fast to be intercepted by Patriot, THAAD, or Navy Lower Tier. While research is under way, no defense against such missiles currently is being built.

The risk that we may someday face such missiles is real. It is true that their longer range makes their development technically more challenging. But the risk of transfer is much the same as for shorter-range missiles. Japan, India, and Brazil all have or are developing ballistic missiles for launching space satellites. Russia may sell a ``space launch'' version of its most modern ballistic missile (the SS-25). China may sell similar space-launch versions of its missiles. While they are sold for space launch, no technical barrier will prevent these missiles from being used to deliver weapons.

We should not wait until such threats actually materialize. The National Security Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives has proposed deploying ground-based interceptors at one or more sites in the United States. This would cost an estimated $5 to 15 billion, and the sites could begin operation in 4 to 7 years.

Interim protection could be achieved by following the recommendation of the Heritage Foundation's Team B report. It suggests taking the Navy's more advanced TMD system (the Navy Upper Tier) and optimizing its capability against longer-range ballistic missiles. This would take advantage of the nearly $50 billion already invested in building the fleet of Aegis ships. At an additional cost estimated at $2 to $3 billion, this approach could provide protection to the American people beginning in three or four years.