Selective terrorism

National Review, Sept 1, 1989 by Avigdor Haselkorn

PALO ALTO, Calif .Earlier this year, a PLO official denied that PLO guerrillas were engaged in

terrorism when they carried out "a military operation . . . aimed at attacking Israeli soldiers."

The PLO has thus joined a growing list of terrorist organizations which have recently claimed adherence to a "selective terrorism" approach aimed, they say, at avoiding noncombatant targets. For example, ETA-Militar, the dominant group within the Basque separatist movement, expressed its "regrets" to the "entire Catalan people" for a murderous bombing in Barcelona in June 1987. It pledged to use "all means" at its disposal "to guarantee the selectivity of its actions." After the

Irish Republican Army's (IRA) November bombing at Enniskillen, Northern Ireland, which killed 11 and injured sixty, its general staff said: "The IRA must link its military victories to its political success, and killing civilians cannot be part of this plan. This would be terrorism." And the general command of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), fighting to oust the regime in El Salvador, said on February 28, 1989, that it will reduce the use of car bombs "because we deem that procedure highly risky for civilians."

Few if any terrorist organizations have actually shifted exclusively to "selective targeting." But the new pattern is increasingly to mix some spectacular operations against "selected" targets with the more familiar terrorist approach. For example, following a car-bomb attack on the British army headquarters in Rheindahlen, West Germany on March 24, 1987, the IRA said it aimed "to inflict a devastating blow, but to avoid civilian casualties."

The propaganda effort launched in conjunction with these operations indicates the strong political motivation of the approach. First, it seeks to undermine whatever cooperation the West has achieved in its counter-terrorism efforts, by reviving a divisive debate over what constitutes terrorism. The new tactic seeks to exploit such ambiguities as those contained in the U.S. State Department's definition of terrorism, namely premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against targets by sub-national groups.

(This formulation discounts, for example, the October 1983 attack on the U.S. Marine headquarters in Beirut, which killed 241 American soldiers. )

Secondly, "selective terrorism" aims to facilitate the radical struggle by politically isolating those resisting it. By pledging publicly to avoid noncombatant targets, militant organizations would like the world to believe that they are engaged in "legitimate resistance," rather than terrorism. It is the authorities' effort to suppress the "legitimate" challenge which must be condemned as "state terrorism."

Third, the apparent shift to "selective terrorism" is meant to overcome the counter-productive effects produced by indiscriminate attacks. On the one hand, terrorist atrocities can trigger a popular backlash; on the other, many Western governments already choose to equate selectivity with moderation. In short, terrorists and their backers are seeking to make terrorism more acceptable, thus more feasible.

Contrary to popular belief, the more pronounced the shift to "selective terrorism" becomes, the graver its strategic consequences will be. First, it is likely to increase the incidence of terrorism through minimizing the political costs involved. Secondly, some terrorists see the "selective" approach as more effective, particularly given the pitfalls of indiscriminate attacks.

Muhammad Abbas, leader of the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), promised to launch "exceptional surprise actions" against selected targets inside Israel: "We believe the main

losses are not in the number of those killed. The main objective is to keep the conflict alive, escalate it, destroy traditional enemy measures against us, and inflict losses on the enemy's political, material, economic, and military structure."

And in recent years terrorists have indeed achieved important victories through campaigns of "selective targeting." The withdrawal of the U.S. Marines from Lebanon resulted from attacks by terrorists. According to Abbas, "selective terrorism" will also target the government's counter-terrorism effort, including its intelligence services. As the image of "selectivity" becomes increasingly confused with "moderation," public demands for governments to come to terms with the terrorists grow. Political solutions are increasingly urged as both feasible and attractive. But under the circumstances, the mere agreement to open political talks would imply government acceptance of its mortal enemies' definition of terrorism. This will legitimize, if not in fact encourage, radical forces to continue their "selective" violence in order to exert pressure on the discussions. The world is much more inclined to view extremist causes with equanimity, provided the violence appears measured. Thus, governments' ability to conduct effective counter-terrorism efforts would be harmed.