How to defeat Hussein - Saddam Hussein

National Review, Sept 3, 1990 by Eliot A. Cohen

WINSTON CHURHHILL favored a forceful reaction to Italy's invasion of Ethiopia in 1935, arguing that the consequences of Fascist success would be "quite incalculable." The calamities of the 1930s confirmed this judgment. The stakes in the Persian Gulf today are, if anything, higher, for Saddam Hussein could threaten the West far more seriously than Mussolini ever did. If we do not defeat Saddam a new power will emerge in the Persian Gulf that will dominate the region and perhaps the entire Arab world. That power, deeply hostile to the West and all it stands for, will have nuclear weapons and the strength that comes from untrammeled brutality in the services of limitless ambition.

There are three possible outcomes to this confrontation. The least likely but far from impossible outcome is that Saddam Hussein may ride out the condemnation of the United States, the Soviet Union, and most other countries. Trade embargoes could leak and ultimately break down; harsh words will certainly be dismissed; neighbors may be dissuaded by sheer terror from retaining an unpopular American military presence. Obviously, in this scenario, Saddam would win and win big.

Alternatively, external pressure may require, or shrewd calculation may suggest, that Saddam adopt a two-steps-forward-one-step-back strategy. Iraq would withdraw from Kuwait, although a client regime would remain in place. In this case Saddam would still win. He would have shown that his most outrageous threats were real and he would escape any real penalty; American statecraft would look like a bluff. Within a year European and Asian countries would be quietly trading with and extending credit to Iraq, and oil prices would be higherSaddam's goal in the first place. Other countries, potential predators and potential prey, would understand that in the post-cold-war world "the strong do what they will, and the weak suffer what they must."

The third possibility is an unambiguous Iraqi defeat including an unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. Given the nature of Saddam's regime, this cannot happen without his fall and perhaps even that of the Ba'athist regime. This outcome, and this outcome alone, can negate Saddam's gains thus far. If dictators of his stamp see that such escapades may cost them their presidential palaces and imperil their heads, they may perceive the cost as outweighing the gains. The United States will have laid down a marker comparable to the one the civilized world should have laid down, but did not, in 1935. But the chances of achieving all this without fighting are, at best, fifty-fifty. It is more likely that the United States will have to pay with blood and treasure, in a war that will leave the Middle East in turmoil for years to come.

The stakes, then, are very high for American statecraft and higher yet for Saddam. The Bush Administration has reacted well, but it now must hammer out a long-term strategy, including a strategy for war. There is a danger that after making harsh statements and deploying vast forces American leaders, who have for a decade ignored Iraqi brutality when they could and tolerated it when they could no longer ignore it, will allow Saddam a disguised but real victory. Already voices are heard suggesting the imprudence or superfluity of actually using force; voices no less reasonable-sounding than those heard in Britain from 1935 to 1939.

The United States has perfected the technology of crisis management but is entrapped by the habit of it. And, indeed, crisis management has been the Bush Administration's approach build a global coalition against Saddam, deploy multinational forces to Saudi Arabia, and enforce sanctions against Iraq. The "theory of victory" appears to be that Saddam's own people will kill him and be willing to evacuate Kuwait shortly thereafter. We will wave a big stick but do not, deep down, expect we will have to use it.

Danger of Paralysis

THIS MAY be the only sensible course of action thus far, but it has weaknesses that must be faced. The very breadth of the antiIraqi alliance will retard effective action, for the more extensive a coalition the weaker its bonds, and the more clumsy its strategic maneuvers. An exasperated French general remarked during World War 1, "Since I have fought as a member of a coalition I have lost all respect for Napoleon." Saddam is no Napoleon, but he can count on paralyzing debates about virtually every aspect of action against him. Saddam's strategy will be to break up the coalition, either by diplomacy (an offer to reduce forces in Kuwait and to guarantee the Saudi border) or by force. He could attack Israel or induce the Israelis to attack him by preparing to launch a chemical attack on Israeli cities. This would ignite an Arab-Israeli crisis, and could well make concerted Western-Arab action against him possible. Or Saddam could launch terrorist operations against the United States in the hope of provoking a response from us that would meet the sharp disapproval of our allies. Saddam has begun to work on other divisions already-between Arab leaders and the Arab man in the street, and between rich Arab countries and poor ones.