Invisible victims - 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement on Northern Ireland

National Review, Sept 26, 1994

|MOVING toward peace in Ulster," judged the Washington Post editorial, urging Congress (which needed no urging) to reassure London and Dublin that "Americans applauded their step toward peace." "The deal offers a chance at peace," added a New York Times editorial, describing it as "ingenious" and "creative" into the bargain.

Such were the hosannas that greeted the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985. They were reprised in December of last year when Britain's John Major and Ireland's Albert Reynolds produced a second Anglo-Irish agreement called the Downing Street Declaration (actually a third if you count the 1973 Sunningdale Agreement, as you should). And they are being sung yet again to celebrate the announcement by the IRA of a "complete cessation of military activities' expected to usher in negotiations among London, Dublin, and constitutional (i.e. non-violent) political parties, including Sinn Fein and its president, Gerry Adams, on the future of Northern Ireland.

A reminder is in order. The results of the 1985 Agreement were not "peace," nor anything like it. They were continued violence by the IRA, greatly increased violence by loyalist terrorists, and complete stalemate between the political parties in Northern Ireland. After some years, the British and Irish governments drew from this failure the conclusion that another such initiative was required. On this occasion, however, the IRA has called a "ceasefire." Why?

Nothing would be more gratifying than clear evidence that the Sinn Fein-IRA has had a change of heart and committed itself to peaceful democratic politics. But Sinn Fein is not a political party in any normal sense; it is the political wing of a terrorist movement. Its democratic credentials are that it gets 2 per cent of the vote in the Irish Republic and 10 per cent in Northern Ireland. The sole basis of its claim to be included in negotiations is that its associates in the IRA murder people. If they did not do so, Gerry Adams would not be interviewed respectfully by journalists, courted by delegations of distinguished Irish-Americans, and praised for his historic contribution to peace (i.e., promising that his accomplices will stop murdering people, at least for the moment).

Far more likely than a change of heart, therefore, is that Sinn Fein-IRA calculated that the British were war-weary and would make important concessions in return for a halt to violence, however temporary. That calculation looks likely to prove correct. Sinn Fein-IRA still withholds a "permanent cessation" of violence, which was supposedly an iron precondition for talks. It offers instead a "complete cessation," which in this context is a synonym for an "impermanent cessation." But the Brits are expected to accept a fudge.

If so, the talks will be conducted under the shadow of a threat: namely, that if Sinn Fein-IRA does not achieve its objectives in negotiations, it will resume terrorism. Since those objectives are incompatible with pledges to the Protestants from both governments, that means either the Protestants will be betrayed or the IRA will renew its murder campaign, probably the latter. In the meantime, it will employ forms of struggle such as street demonstrations and civil disobedience (a/k/a riots and intimidation) designed to create conflict between the Catholic and Protestant communities and between British troops and loyalists. (See "From the Editor," page 6.) Then, at some point when the pot is nicely boiling, the IRA will denounce British intransigence, withdraw from the talks, and begin bombing and shooting again.

Is there a more optimistic scenario? Certainly. Suppose that negotiations produce a "deal" involving joint authority by Dublin and London over Northern Ireland. That is unlikely but just possible.

Does anyone imagine, however, that Protestants would simply acquiesce? Loyalist terrorists have the distinction of having committed more murders in the last three years than the IRA. And one may reasonably suppose that, in murder as in other things, practice makes perfect. In these circumstances, they would conclude that since the British Government was now their enemy, and the unionist political leaders its dupes or worse, they would have to fend for themselves. Loyalist attacks on the Catholic nationalist community (by this time under firm IRA control), on the politicians and civil servants from London and Dublin who administer joint authority, on the British Army, and on innocent bystanders would grow in numbers and seriousness. As the conflict worsened, the IRA would re-enter it.

Under fire from two sides, the British might soldier on, or they might not. If they did, the ultimate result of the negotiations now eagerly awaited would be more terrorist murders and more repression in defense of constitutional structures that would have less popular support and legitimacy than the present ones.

But if the British scuttled, leaving the locals to fight it out, as they did in India, Pakistan, and Aden, the result would be a Bosnia-style civil war of ethnic cleansing, for which indeed the IRA is already preparing. Such a conflict would most likely end with Ireland divided between a Catholic South of 28 counties instead of the present 26, and a Protestant North of 4 counties rather than 6, with Belfast reduced to a Beirut. Not a great deal to show for thousands of deaths. And even if the North were to be wholly subdued in the war and Irish unity proclaimed over the prostrate body of unionism, that would merely usher in a guerrilla war waged by recalcitrant Protestants against Dublin.