Can Saddam climb down? - Saddam Hussein

National Review, Oct 1, 1990 by Ian Alexander

OH, MY! How did I get into this? ... Who cares? How do I get out?" Unless Saddam Hussein is contemplating going out in a terrible blaze, taking as many others with him as possible, he is clearly considering his options for climbing down from the perilous perch on which he has placed himself

The odds, of course, are now very much stacked against Saddam, as he should in large part have calculated from the beginning. But, as befits a megalomaniac of such staggering proportions, his miscalculations have been monumental:

-Misinterpreting the Kuwaiti level of discontent with the ruling Al Sabah family: not one dissident would take up Saddam's offers-virtual pleas-to become puppet prime minister of the "liberated" country.

-Not comprehending that the longing of the resident Palestinians (four hundred thousand strong) for their homeland would not be assuaged by the setting up of a Palestine East in Kuwait (instead, in the days immediately following the invasion, gangs of Palestinian youths roamed Kuwait's streets and hurled stones at Iraqi soldiers in a surprising replay of the intifada that has been going on in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank for more than two years). -Misreading the degree of resolve in the Bush Administration, the Congress, and the American people. -Presuming his carefully televised encounter with a group of British detainees would be viewed as benign rather than sinister. -Worst of all, totally underestimating the reaction of all but a handful of leaders (Arafat, Qaddafi, Castro-the usual suspects) to his invasion of the virtually defenseless Kuwait.

THE VOTE of 12 fellow members of the Arab League to denounce the invasion, to provide military assistance to Saudi Arabia, and to support the UN embargo has been a crushing reminder, if any were needed, that the "Arab nation" is far from being one body and that there are limits beyond which reasonable Arab leaders and their people cannot be pushed.

With hardly a friend left, Saddam is surely devoting an increasingly large comer of his mind to how to extract himself from his self-made trap. He must be furiously considering how he might withdraw under cover of Kuwaiti concessions.

In the event a settlement could be negotiated, there would of course be the need to put a good face on the matter with the Iraqi man-in-the-street-not a simple task, since Saddam, in a speech in August, termed the invasion the all-inspiring jihad, or holy war. He redoubled the plea September 4, at the same time calling for the overthrow of his Saudi and Egyptian counterparts, who were his staunchest supporters in the war with Iran.

Controlling the spin will be particularly hard in the wake of Saddam's stupefying announcement that Iraq would accept all Iran's peace terms. One senior Arab diplomat here observed, "However brilliant the tactic of freeing more than two hundred thousand troops for use on the Saudi front, the impact of such massive wasted blood and wealth over eight years will hit the Iraqis very hard. With five hundred thousand casualties, more than 30 per cent of Iraqi families have suffered a direct loss in the conflict with Iran. They remember Saddam's ceaseless preaching that the war was the country's most glorious chapter. Now that they see it was all in vain, there will be much more than a credibility gap."

A senior Western diplomat put Saddam's dilemma in similarly gloomy terms: "If Saddam withdraws from Kuwait, he faces political suicide. If he stays, he faces economic suicide. If he invades Saudi Arabia, he faces military suicide. It is hard to see a solution that has him remaining in power long term."

But politics in the Levant are notorious for their unexpected turns. In recent weeks, King Hussein of Jordan, the West's perennial "friendly Arab ruler," has made himself a laughing stock in chancelleries from Riyadh to Rabat to Rome, not to mention less alliterative centers like Cairo, London, and Washington. Coincidentally, Syria's Hafez Al-Assad, until last month regarded as perhaps the most cunning and treacherous Arab leader of all, is taken as a serious collaborator in the same capitals.

Has Saddam, the ultimate survivor, finally gone too far? Were it almost anyone else, the answer would be virtually certain. But more than one grizzled observer of the man and the region is unwilling to be categorical.

This reporter remembers well the 48 hours following Israel's lightning six-day conquest of its Arab foes in 1967. He watched from the terrace of Beirut's unscathed Phoenicia InterContinental Hotel on successive afternoons as mobs of more than thirty thousand marched in near riotous, righteous fury. The first day, the rabble denounced Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser for causing the calamity; the second, they proclaimed him the only true Arab hero. Nasser survived the chaos to serve as Egypt's and the Arabs' leader until his death from natural causes three years later.

Can Saddam climb down and maintain himself in power? As of now, it seems highly unlikely, despite lingering fears that he may be capable of one last, spectacular volte-face.