Myth of the racist cabbie - rational discrimination versus racism

National Review, Oct 9, 1995 by Dinesh D'Souza

** In general, one construction-company owner said, for urban blacks "the quality of education is not as great as white folk from the suburbs, and it shows."

** Another employer remarked, "The Polish immigrants that I know are more highly motivated than the Hispanics."

** One manufacturer said, "We are not shutting out any black specifically, but I will say that our experience has been bad."

The authors conclude that employers are using race as a proxy for "aspects of productivity that are relatively expensive or impossible to measure." Many employers do seem to recognize diversity among blacks, often describing a particular individual as a good prospect, "the exception to the rule." Nevertheless, employers do use group generalizations, so that in Kirschenman and Neckerman's view, "black job applicants, unlike their white counterparts, must indicate to employers that the stereotypes do not apply to them."

Rational discrimination may be difficult to understand in hiring, yet its economic justification is obvious in other areas. Insurance companies, for example, have no special dislike for teenage boys, but they charge them higher rates than female and older drivers. This is very unfair to an individual teenage boy who is a skilled and cautious driver, because he is penalized on account of the statistical habits of a group he did not voluntarily join. Yet even with reasonably thorough personal information, companies are not in a good position to predict individual behavior.

IS discrimination based on race necessarily racist? Not if you define racism as a doctrine of intrinsic superiority and inferiority, which leads to judgments against a group on grounds of biology rather than conduct. Indeed, the existence of rational discrimination compels us to revise the liberal paradigm which holds that racism is the theory and discrimination is the practice. The two may be unconnected. It is possible to be a racist and not discriminate: this would be true of many poor and marginalized whites who might hate blacks and consider them inferior, but who are not in a position to enforce their convictions. So too it is possible to discriminate and not be a racist: this would constitute rational discrimination.

Just because discrimination can be rational, however, does not mean that it is always moral. When individuals and companies make decisions not to go to great lengths to ensure that they are not misjudging any particular person, they are sacrificing the just treatment of individuals at the altar of security, convenience, or profits. Even though such judgments may be prudent and realistic, they are not, strictly speaking, fair. Rational discrimination based on unalterable traits is problematic in a way that discrimination against high-school dropouts and convicted felons is not.

Thus the question of whether rational discrimination should be legal is a real one. The new public-policy dilemma is based on the recognition that discrimination sometimes makes practical sense, and that such discrimination forces a choice in which the claims of morality are on one side, and the claims of rationality and productivity are on the other.