Watching the dragon: as China's military and economic strength increases, the United States must keep an eye on the Far East

National Review, Oct 14, 1996 by Franklin L. Lavin

Peking's actions vis-a-vis Taiwan provoke the same sort of theories as the Spratlys action, with most observers pointing to the role Taiwan plays in Peking's domestic politics, Peking's desire to deflate Taiwan's growing independence movement, and in particular the desire to disrupt the Taiwan elections.

But military operations are based on calculations not of a country's absolute ability to act, but of its relative ability. One must look at the target of the action as well as the actor. And clearly, the mammoth asymmetry in the region is an inducement for China to be mischievous. Although the rates of economic growth China enjoys do not differ substantially from the rates of growth in Taiwan or its ASEAN neighbors (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam), the absolute difference is substantial because of China's much larger GDP. China and Malaysia, for example, enjoy growth rates of 9.8 per cent and 8.5 per cent respectively. But because China's GDP is perhaps 50 times larger than Malaysia's, China's economy grows by the entire Malaysian economy every 10 weeks. Not incidentally, China's population grows by the entire Malaysian population every 40 weeks.

The military contrasts are starker still. Anyone wondering why the Philippines did not choose a direct military response to China's move on Mischief Reef need only compare the two countries' forces. [See table, facing page.] The differences between China and the Philippines are striking; force levels are on a completely different order of magnitude. For comparison purposes, the Philippines are actually closer to "Force X," which incidentally is the New York City Police Department.

AS SMALL as each of the other nations of the region is compared to China, do they at least have the ability to work together on security matters?

At present there is more security consultation in the region than ever before, through the three-year-old ASEAN Regional Forum, a loose multilateral consultative mechanism. Somewhat similar to the former Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe -- the Helsinki Agreement -- the ARF is not a mutual-security organ or a defense pact, but a mechanism to promote confidence-building measures such as "transparency."

The third gathering of the ARF took place this July in Indonesia. Not surprisingly, China remains an unenthusiastic participant. Why would the emerging power in the region want to constrain its operating flexibility by bolstering a multilateral body? The problem of the ARF is the endemic problem of multilateral consultations: the most serious participants do not pose the most serious problems; the most serious problems are not within the grasp of the most serious participants. And while the ARF is of some limited use in dealing with South China Sea issues, it cannot even raise the matter of China - Taiwan, because all ARF member-countries recognize only one China.

So the answer for now, at least, is, No -- the countries of the region cannot work together on regional security matters. Even ASEAN, as useful an organization as it is, deals only with economic and political issues and is not a security organization. Each country in the region stands more or less alone.