Watching the dragon: as China's military and economic strength increases, the United States must keep an eye on the Far East

National Review, Oct 14, 1996 by Franklin L. Lavin

Thus considering the region in isolation, the classical ingredients for expansion are present: a regional power in economic/military ascendancy; an enormous disparity in forces between it and the other countries in the region; and the lack of a regional security arrangement that might allow the smaller powers to coordinate their response.

Rather than ask why Peking expands, we might do better to ask, "Why not?" At present, there is virtually no cost to such actions. In fact, the noteworthy development would have been if China had not seized territory when presented with such an opportunity. We should fully expect China to continue to exploit similar opportunities --unless something changes the equation.

Taiwan presents a thornier problem, since it represents a political challenge to Peking and does have substantial military capability. It enjoys sympathy in the region but (like China) has no military allies in the world. Although Peking could not conquer Taiwan militarily at this point, it could easily stir up commercial and financial turmoil on the island. Again, a balancing power is needed to deter any miscalculations on Peking's part.

We have already begun to see an unhealthy dynamic at play since the Mischief Reef incident. When Peking grabbed the reef it did not grab the interest of senior U.S. Government officials. U.S. Defense Department officials insist that the atoll is now devoid of Chinese personnel, hence not a problem. Similarly, in Senate testimony, Admiral Macke, the Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Pacific Forces, said the island would be used by Chinese fishing fleets, not by the Chinese military.

In the absence of a clear U.S. response, the reaction in the region was predictable, with the governments involved expressing only mild misgiving. Some observers note that ASEAN countries' preference is for quiet diplomacy. True, they strive for a low-key, collegial response on most issues; but in this case the United States is leaving them no option but quiet diplomacy. The ASEAN states are never going to be more forceful than the United States in confronting China. After all, they have to live with the consequences of a failed policy.

In recent months Singapore's Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew has spoken in favor of greater "transparency" by China over its moves and motives in the South China Sea. Lee is the elder statesman of the region, and one who chooses his words carefully; and so his suggestion is a signal of the growing discontent among the Southeast Asian leadership.

Perhaps learning its lessons from the weak response to Mischief Reef, the United States unfolded a very different response to the war games in the Taiwan Straits, making a strong protest and dispatching two carrier battle groups to the region.

U.S. - China diplomacy, given to short-term ups and downs, too often relegates strategic responses to the background. This short-term fixation has become particularly pronounced in the Clinton era. Well-intentioned but unrealizable human-rights goals are fashioned into public ultimatums and blithely rejected by the Chinese. A series of bilateral trade negotiations seems to go successfully, but later reviews reveal sizable gaps in Chinese performance. On a more serious level, the Chinese government declines to help the United States either with North Korea or with nuclear-related sales to Iran.