Watching the dragon: as China's military and economic strength increases, the United States must keep an eye on the Far East

National Review, Oct 14, 1996 by Franklin L. Lavin

By overemphasizing unobtainable goals and underemphasizing security issues, the Clinton Administration seems to have spent most of the past three years trying to convince the Chinese government not to take the United States seriously. It has largely succeeded.

Reversing this effect will be a longterm project, with some cost and some friction involved. Fortunately, there are a number of options available. The United States can readily improve security consultations with the ASEAN countries. It could go a bit further, with a show of military coordination, perhaps even joint exercises. The U.S. has a fair amount of military equipment in its inventory that it could sell -- or even give -- to some ASEAN nations. And the United States needs to begin the awkward process of engaging in military-to-military discussions with its former enemy, Vietnam.

A similar package of activities could be devised for Taiwan. If the PRC conducts missile tests off Taiwan, the United States should look into what type of anti-missile systems it should develop with Taiwan. If the PRC interferes with shipping to Taiwan, the U.S. needs to practice convoy escort coordination with the Taiwan Navy. The point is to ensure that every untoward act by the PRC has an equal and opposite reaction.

In addition to some carrots for the ASEAN countries and Taiwan, the United States should look at some sticks to use on China itself. What about a stronger response from the White House via a special emissary to Peking, or even suspending the U.S. naval-port visits to China and other U.S. - PRC military-to-military programs? Such moves should be part of the policy discussion in the event of a repeat incident.

And a repeat incident there will be. Because the broader problem is that China is an ascending military power, without much of a history of successful international behavior. Chinese and non-Chinese have been clumsy in their dealings with each other. The United States needs to focus on rewarding cooperative behavior and attaching a cost to uncooperative behavior.

In doing so, our government needs to combine resoluteness of policy with a temperate, consistent, non-accusatory presentation -- the exact opposite of the Clinton Administration's human-rights approach so far, in which a malleable policy was put forward in a flamboyant, accusatory fashion. Our goal should not be to chastise a proud nation, nor to embarrass its leaders, nor to deny it a natural pre-eminence in its own backyard. It should simply be to preclude expansion by use of force. In contrast to our response to the ideologically driven expansionism of the Soviet Union, there is no need for a global geopolitical offensive against China.

Although a sharp and public response might give American political leadership satisfaction and be immediately popular, it would not necessarily lead to better behavior on the part of the Chinese leaders. Indeed, sharp public criticism would give them nationalist incentives to reject U.S. goals. As President Clinton discovered in his human-rights initiative, once criticism becomes public, China's national pride and sovereign decision-making capability matter more to Peking than substantive points.