What does Japan owe us? - allocating Japan's share of cost of Operation Desert Shield - column

National Review, Oct 15, 1990 by William F. Buckley, Jr.

I think I am correct in saying that not one anti-Nipponese syllable has issued from these fingers since V-J Day, so that it is fair to say that the Japanese have been provocative even to those who seek especially to understand them. And the Japanese have got to recognize that the eruption in the Senate on Monday reflects the national mood. What happened was that several senators stared at Japan's offer of one billion dollars to help finance the Persian Gulf operation and all but voted to return the one billion, on the grounds that the United States does not accept tips.

Senator DAmato, when aroused (which is about once a week), knows how to express resentment. I certainly believe the Japanese have been acting totally within the character that they usually do. They are motivated by profit, greed, and avarice, and for them not to step forward and make a contribution to this mission is unconscionable." That's what they call plain talk. But he was hardly alone. Senator McCain likened the billion-dollar pledge to 'a few token shillings." And he reminded us all that if combat arises, it win not be Japanese boys whose lives are at risk, it will be American boys." The Senate settled for a resolution warning of a detrimental impact" on relations with the United States. Which raises the interesting question: What is a detrimental impact? Measured in sticks and stones?

Many of those who believe in protectionism are too honest to channel antiJapanese sentiment generated by exiguous contributions to the Persian Gulf operation into protectionist lobbying. But many aren't. It is a common attribute to co-opt indignation over one offense into an excuse to punish for another. Al Capone was had up for income-tax evasion.

But it is up to the United States to quantify detrimental impact. How might this be done?

Waal, Japan imports just 60 per cent of its oil from the Persian Gulf, which is to say, as of last year, 2.6 million barrels per day. That comes to 949 million barrels. We'll round that figure to one billion barrels.

And (we will continue to round the figures) if oil was at $20 before the Iraqi invasion, and is now at $30, then one year's interruption of oil at the free-market rate would cost Japan $10 billion.

Let us engage in some hypothetical calculations:

If Iraq had succeeded in annexing Kuwait and then gone on to conquer, or at least to Finlandize, Saudi Arabia, and if Iraq then propelled OPEC toward the $40 oil that was commonplace in the Seventies, adjusting roughly for inflation, we are talking about $50 oil. That would cost Japan $30 billion per year.

That the price is not thus rising is owing to the intervention of the United States. If the price returns to $20 following the collapse of Iraq, then that will be owing to United States intervention.

Either hypothesis would suggest an allocation of costs by the United States to Persian Gulf oil clients. If the $10 increment is worth $10 billion over the course of one year to Japan, then the monthly cost is about $800 million.

And a bill in that amount should be sent to the government of Japan.

What if Japan refused to pay it? Do we raise tariffs to punish it?

Under no circumstances do we raise tariffs for any reason other than national defense. What we do instead is escort Japan's Persian Gulf oil to Japanese ports-and charge for it at a rate that reflects that monthly obligation.

And, having come up with a suitable formula, we present the appropriate bill to Germany, to France, to Italy, and to Great Britain. We don't charge for the factor that American lives are on the line, not theirs. That is the grace we give them, appropriate for a superpower.