Beyond 'bottom up.' - failure Secretary of Defense Les Aspin's "Bottom Up Review" on US military readiness

National Review, Nov 15, 1993 by Eliot A. Cohen

The Aspin Pentagon is supposed to have an assistant secretary who will specialize in the use of the armed forces for purposes other than their central, irreducible function-destroying things and killing people in support of national policy. Killing and destruction at minimum cost to oneself (and, increasingly, to enemy noncombatants) requires exceptional training and preparation. If not exercised often and in demanding conditions, those skills dissipate. The civilian leadership, above all, owes it to the nation to make clear just what price will be paid for military adventures that have little to do with preparation for war.

5. Re-establish civilian control. Which brings us to the most important problem of all for the future of American defense policy: the establishment of civil-military relations in which civilians exercise the proper supervision of their military subordinates. The Clinton Administration began with an appalling set of episodes, which included junior White House aides insulting combat-decorated generals, junior officers mocking with impunity the Commander-in-Chief (a court-martial offense under the Uniform Code of Military Justice), and a humiliating climbdown by the President on a thoughtless campaign pledge to repeal the military's ban on homosexuals. Some public-relations gestures notwithstanding, the problem remains.

This mixture of indifference to the military's core values and spinelessness in the face of its defiance has undermined discipline throughout the defense establishment. After the Tailhook scandal, the Bush Administration surely erred in failing to demand the resignation of the Chief of Naval Operations--who, as the senior military officer of the service, should have accepted responsibility for the misconduct of his subordinates. It made little sense for the new secretary of the Navy to attempt to fire him two years later--but it made less sense yet for the defense secretary to emasculate the civilian head of the service by ignoring his recommendation.

Real civilian control does not stem from the firing of generals or their public rebuke, although that may occasionally prove necessary. Nor does it result from shrugging off their advice. Nor yet does it consist (as too many conservatives believe) in deferring to military wishes on all occasions. Rather, it consists in affection and respect for military values and the men and women who adhere to them, combined with a remorseless and probing examination of how military organizations do their business. Civilian leaders should rarely dictate. They must have no qualms, however, about cross-examining, querying, and prodding their subordinates on all matters, no matter how petty or technical.

At all times, but particularly as the armed forces shrink, civilian leaders have a particular responsibility to review their personnel systems and to monitor the tone and temperament of military organizations. Anyone familiar with the services knows that as the force has shrunk too many of the people who should have stayed have left; too many of those who have stayed have done so because they have played the promotion game assiduously, getting the right assignments and staying out of trouble. Naturally enough, in a shrinking military, promotion boards seek reasons to turn down officers for higher rank, and they do so by fastening on the mistakes that come from taking risks. In many cases it is too late to do much about it, but the civilian leadership of the Department of Defense must intervene to make sure that the personnel system does not produce an officer corps that is populated by cautious, smooth careerists.