Theirs to lose - Republican control of Congress - Editorial

PERSPECTIVE is all. Compared to the way things looked at the end of October, the election results are surprisingly good for the GOP. Republicans kept both Houses of Congress and held Bill Clinton to below 50 per cent of the popular vote. No presidential landslide, no congressional wipe-out, and a very poor return on John Sweeney's $35 million. Compared to the prospects as of 18 months ago, however, the re-election of Bill Clinton by a solid majority is a letdown. It has the feeling of a brilliant conjuring trick in defiance of larger historical trends shown in the GOP's retention of the House in the face of a massive MediScare disinformation campaign and the GOP's gains in the Senate (which might have been more dramatic if close races had tipped the other way).

So the result leaves people with a "Morning After in America" feeling. Those voters who were either "concerned" about or "scared" by the prospect of a Clinton win outnumbered those who were "excited" or "optimistic" by 52 to 46 per cent. With GOP control of Congress, investigations into the Clinton scandals will proceed apace, with the likely result that the ranks of the "concerned" and "scared" will increase. In these circumstances, 1996 looks like a decision to defer full realignment and absorb the political changes of the last two years before moving on again.

Why this deferment? Put simply, the President, like most incumbents, was the beneficiary of the "Bush recovery," an upward swing in the trade cycle that he inherited from his predecessor and which Alan Greenspan nurtured. Mr. Clinton and Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin deserve some of the credit -- but so does the 1994 Republican Congress, which forced the Administration to accept a balanced budget (at least in theory) and soothed the markets. Against this economic background, Mr. Dole's claim that the economy was in the tank sounded sour and shrill. So the Dole - Kemp campaign faced an uphill struggle from the start.

Nonetheless, there were attitudes in the electorate which the GOP could have played on more successfully than it did. Exit polls showed that 52 per cent of the voters thought the Federal Government should do less, with only 42 per cent wanting it to do more. Fifty-four per cent rejected the idea, incessantly bruited by the media, that the Republican Congress was too conservative. And natural Republican issues like crime, educational standards, and the deficit were rated as important by the voters -- but benefited Mr. Clinton.

Two things happened. The President waged a brilliantly unscrupulous campaign, stealing Republican issues, striking conservative attitudes, and courageously endorsing such moves as school uniforms and teenage curfews. The GOP allowed him to play both sides of the street on bigger issues, signing bills to curb welfare and illegal immigration, while assuring his own base that he would fix them later. Dick Morris celebrated the success of this strategy on several post-election talk shows.

By contrast the Republicans ran an inept, unfocused, and timid campaign. It began in San Diego with a convention produced by Oprah Winfrey. It continued with too exclusive an emphasis on the 15 per cent tax cut. Cutting taxes -- to restrain government as much as to empower people -- is a key element in any Republican program. But when rates are much lower than their late-1970s high, and when the economy is much stronger than in its late-1970s stagflationary low, tax cuts inevitably have a less dramatic appeal.

The social issues -- above all, partial-birth abortion -- which especially concern Catholics and the "Reagan Democrats," were never seriously addressed. In particular, opportunities to raise them seriously in the debates were thrown away. Opposition to "gay marriage," which is the opinion of two-thirds of Americans, was so furtive that Bill Clinton was able to steal the issue, signing the Defense of Marriage Act late at night but boasting about it on Christian radio stations.

Then, in the final weeks, Bob Dole adopted a California strategy, campaigning against affirmative-action quotas and immigration overload. In effect, electoral necessity finally persuaded the Dole - Kemp team to do too late in the day what they should have done from San Diego on. They could have made these national issues against the Democrats. As it was, the California Civil Rights Initiative won by 2 to 1; Bill Clinton carried the state.

Aggravating all these strategic faults were the Republican candidates themselves. Despite their fine personal qualities and the gallantry of their final push, neither Bob Dole nor Jack Kemp proved able to articulate a clear, appealing, and credible message.

As a result, Republicans saw several cohorts of the Reagan coalition depart. The much-touted gender gap finally hurt the GOP -- but not as liberals argue. Women voted for Clinton over Dole by 54 to 37 per cent, but this disparity has recently been common. It is usually offset by men voting Republican by similar or greater margins. This year, Clinton split the male vote 44 to 44 per cent.