Wartime? - Persian Gulf crisis - column

National Review, Dec 3, 1990 by William F. Buckley, Jr.

erning the possibility of war in the Persian Gulf, a few observations:

1. A mini-swell of resentment is audible on the matter of the composition of our military forces in Saudi Arabia. Way back in August, a Midwestern college professor expressed his resentment (in an op-ed article for the New York Times) at his son's being sent to Saudi Arabia. What was the young man doing in the Marines? Simple, said dad, he was quite innocently there in order to accumulate the points needed to get a free college education. Other people seem to have the same problem: it never occurs to them that the reason the U.S. spends $300 billion a year on defense is to train and equip young men, who for the past 17 years have all been volunteers, to fight, if required to do so.

And to fight means to run the risk of dying. It is infrequently that we encounter such a bloodbath as our Civil War. The statistics are not readily available, but it is likely that a thirty-year stint in the military, over the course of American history, hasn't required greater exposure to mayhem than the equivalent served as a firefighter or a policeman. The caterwauling of such as Mr. Charles Peters, the jolly grouch of The Washington Monthly, on the subject of the social and economic background of men who are serving in the armed forces is not really relevant. His complaint is that these are the sons of the poor, which may be the case, but does not justify the suggestion that decisions affecting the risk of combat will be made by men indifferent to their fate because they are themselves sons of power and affluence. A reader of Ronald Reagan's memoirs will know the agony he experienced when the 241 Marines were killed in Lebanon. The sons (and daughters) of influential Americans are regularly spotted trying to gain admission to West Point or Annapolis. The notion that the President or Congress is indifferent to the life & limb of our armed forces in virtue of having ascertained that they are substantially made up of children of the working class is bizarre as a generality, contemptible as a presumptive consideration of an American Commander-in-Chief contemplating the question of war or peace.

2. That a soldier must be prepared to risk his life is plain, but of course does not illuminate the question whether, in pursuit of this tactic or that strategy, the soldier is prudently deployed. In the Gulf crisis, Mr. Bush made a speedy decision, which is not necessarily the same thing as a hasty decision. He grasped the fundamental geopolitical threat posed by Iraq's aggression and resolved that it had to be opposed. That his judgment was politically correct was quickly confirmed by the virtual unanimity with which first the American public, and then the leaders of other nations, joined in acclaiming his initiative.

3. If Mr. Bush had struck Iraq on or about Labor Day, the probability is high that he'd have had the near-universal backing of the American people. The passage of time has substantially altered that. For one thing, the sixty days have passed after which the War Powers Act attempts to oblige the Commander-in-Chief to consult with Congress in any situation that might lead to military action. Having caught our fingers in the UN assembly line we are theoretically bound to move forward only in concert with it. This means that any one member of the Security Council thinks of himself as having a veto over United States military action. We have already been made aware by Gorbachev and Mitterrand that they are not disposed to press the military point.

4. The venture becomes preposterous if we do not have our way. I.e., if Iraq is left with Saddam Hussein plus nuclear reactors plus chemical/biological weapons. But to go forward without consulting Congress becomes an exercise in arbitrary executive power. If it happened that at midnight tonight our Peeping Tom satellites detected the arming of Iraqi missiles, Mr. Bush could legitimately exercise his authority to order an immediate strike. But if he hands to Hussein what is in effect an ultimatum-get out of Kuwait, make reparations, and prepare for an inspecting force to dismantle your strategic arsenal-he must have the consent of Congress. There are constitutional and political grounds for insisting on the point.