Yeltsin's unfinished revolution

National Review, Dec 14, 1992 by Elisabeth Rubinfien, Daniel Sneider

Moscow

IN post-Soviet Russia, political crises are as frequent and as predictable as winter snow flurries. The next is scheduled to erupt on December 1, when the Congress of People's Deputies, the nation's highest legislature, convenes its winter session.

There, President Boris Yeltsin will confront yet another in a seemingly endless series of challenges to his rule. An array of enemies, from unrepentant Communists to nostalgic worshipers of the earlier incarnation of the Russian Empire, will rise to assail him. At stake are the future of the two shaky pillars of the Yeltsin government the emerging market economy and the half-formed democracy.

So far Boris Yeltsin has emerged triumphant from each such engagement. He has relied on two political talents that eluded his now-carping predecessor-the abilities to speak to the common man and to forge viable compromises. And so far, he has avoided Mikhail Gorbachev's suicidal tendency to surround himself with enemies.

All of these crises ultimately stem from the unfinished character of the Second Russian Revolution--that is, from Mr. Yeltsin's failure to create a post-Soviet political system. A year ago, riding on the wave of elation and faith that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, Mr. Yeltsin decided not to dissolve the Congress and call new elections. He dallied in preparing a new constitution. He decided not to form his own party and bring the ragtag democrats together under his flag.

As a result, he is left fighting with the past. What looks like a straightforward confrontation between government and parliament is really a battle with the remnants of the old system. The Congress of People's Deputies was elected in 1990, when Russia was still part of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party was still dominant. The standing parliament, the Supreme Soviet, is elected from its ranks.

For the past year, the Congress and the Supreme Soviet have obstructed a number of key measures, including a draft constitution that would create an entirely new bicameral legislature, along with a strong executive.

Many democrats urged Mr. Yeltsin to dissolve the Congress a year ago and hold new elections. But the president's decision not to do so seemed defensible at the time. It was still unclear what was going to happen to the Soviet Union, and the autumn was filled with struggle to define a new course for the country. That issue was resolved only in December, when Russia and its two Slavic partners signed the Minsk agreement. On the heels of that momentous event, Russia was scheduled to start its ambitious program of shock-therapy economic reforms crafted by reform czar, now acting premier, Yegor Gaidar.

Alongside those practical considerations, Mr. Yeltsin's hesitation is also a product of his tendency arrogantly to rely on his personal strength to get what he wants. Instead of holding new elections, Mr. Yeltsin managed to persuade the Congress last December to grant him emergency powers that allow him to legislate by decree. Those powers were extended in April, though at the cost of slowing down economic reforms. This extra authority expires on December 1, making their extension the key issue of this gathering.

Since that first fateful decision, Mr. Yeltsin has had two options: to compromise and buy the time to push reforms through, hoping the economy will improve enough to enable him to redress his error; or to go for a frontal confrontation, dissolve the Congress, and count on his popularity.

Mr. Yeltsin holds this latter option as a sword over the head of the parliament. The rumors and denials of an imminent move to presidential rule-- an ominous term which no one can exactly define--are all part of this game of nerves. Radical democrats advocate this approach, and urge the president to hold a popular referendum on the key questions of land privatization and approval of a new constitution.

But for all the bluster, Mr. Yeltsin is most likely to choose Option Number One. The democrats are too disorganized to be reliable allies, and the economy is too rocky to risk holding an election now. Moreover, things always look worst of all here in November and December, as the winter snows deepen and daylight diminishes. An election in the upbeat mood of spring would be safer.

Moreover, Mr. Yeltsin is confident he can come away from this Congress with most of what he wants that is, that he will retain crucial powers, and reforms will remain basically on track.

On November 14, Mr. Yeltsin hinted how he intends to do that when he spoke to a meeting of some one thousand Russian enterprise directors, largely from the military-industrial complex, who have been demanding changes in the government's radical economic reform program. He cracked the whip, saying sternly that the industrial lobby's demand for another trillion rubles in subsidies would not be fulfilled. "I don't want to deceive you," he said. "I must state dearly there will be no trillion."

The audience greeted the president's forceful speech with only a smattering of applause. But for the next ninety minutes he could be seen on the dais, chatting up Arkady Volsky, head of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, as if he had no differences with one of the most powerful critics of the current reform program.