Settling for less - communities and volunteer organizations replacing bureaucratic efforts

National Review, Dec 19, 1994 by Amitai Etzioni

IN Key West, Florida, a sign facing Cuba reads: "When the last Cuban leaves Cuba, please turn off the light." Things actually happen the other way around: as Cubans find themselves without light and other essentials, they leave the island in droves. So far the focus has been on the refugees intercepted at sea and detained at Guantanamo Bay. We rarely hear about the roughly 30,000 Cubans who have landed in the U.S. this year. Their experience can teach us a lesson about how to address social problems.

As the recent waves of Cubans washed ashore on the coasts of Florida, Governor Lawton Chiles called on the Federal Government for help. His appeal brought to mind how the government handled the 125,266 Cubans who arrived during the Mariel exodus of 1980. I know a bit about this story, because at the time I was serving in the White House, with an august title (Senior Advisor) but with rather little influence, as you will see.

The Marielitos generated panic in the corridors of power. In the preceding year anti-immigrant emotions had mounted as other countries refused to accept additional refugees from Southeast Asia, forcing the U.S. to double (to 168,000) its yearly admission of boat people. Nationwide, social services were overloaded and the cry was out for federal help. The White House convened a working group to formulate a new refugee policy. As the only resident sociologist, I was put on this task force.

An implicit theme ran through the draft recommendations generated before my arrival: the task force wanted to federalize the problem. After calling the situation a "crisis," the reports urged that all local, private, and public resources be pooled in a master "coordinated" effort. The alphabet soup of federal agencies--HEW (later HHS), DoL (Labor), and HUD--would coordinate the effort.

Coordinating the Coordinators

OF course, these agencies themselves required coordination. It was suggested that the U.S. coordinator for refugee affairs crown the federal hierarchy of coordinated coordinators. Concerned that all this might be insufficient, the draft report added that the President in particular, but also the Vice President, the Domestic Policy Council, the U.S. refugee-affairs office, and the secretaries of various Cabinet departments would provide the leadership required to translate this national commitment into domestic receptivity and understanding. The report concluded by stating explicitly what had previously been implied: "If confusion and fragmentation which exist in many areas of refugee concentration are to be ameliorated, the Federal Government will need to designate--and fund--lead agencies to carry out this responsibility."

I suggested that an emergency coalition of voluntary associations, working with local communities, could handle the situation better than the Federal Government. The rest of the task force was intrigued by the notion, but Victor Palmieri, recently appointed as the U.S. coordinator for refugee affairs, argued that the voluntary agencies would never agree to assume such a heavy responsibility.

My reply was to visit these associations and ask them. The first stop was Bill Aramony, head of the United Way. He was reluctant to accept the financial obligations involved but offered to put the executives of the United Way to work coordinating the voluntary drive, exactly what the government felt had to be its mission. Next he ushered me into a meeting that included representatives of Catholic Charities of America, the Salvation Army, and the National Urban League. They said that if others would assist, they would carry their share of the burden.

Next stop was George Elsey of the Red Cross, who was enthusiastic. I got the impression that he wanted a dramatic, visible mission to get everybody's juices flowing. The reaction of Landrum Bolling, chairman of the Council of Foundations, was similarly positive. And so it went.

When I reported my findings, with a bit of self-satisfaction, a new objection was raised. Dealing with refugees was the turf of the small charitable organizations that have long worked on behalf of particular refugee groups. I was told that they would be deeply offended if "their" mission was taken over by the "big boys," with whom they had less than harmonious relations. Federalization would keep the White House out of this conflict.

I tried one last maneuver. I suggested that the government urge the voluntary groups to consider a division of labor under which the small ones would stick to the jobs with which they had the most experience--overseas camps and first help on arrival. The big groups would take on the difficult tasks of finding or creating jobs, housing, and so on.

Time had run out. Palmieri wrote that my ideas were "useful," but he preferred other options and hence was not going to rely on mine in "any major way." Soon President Carter authorized him to follow the traditional pattern of throwing a federal agency at the problem. The U.S. Refugee Resettlement Agency, with Palmieri at the helm, took on the mission. Congress appropriated additional funds and authorized additional bureaucrats. Palmieri hired people, drafted plans, prepared guidelines, contacted federal agencies, and so on.