Electing the peoples - immigration as a political issue

National Review, Dec 23, 1996 by John O'Sullivan

Immigration is now a major issue in American elections. It may soon become the decisive one.

THE prize for the most perverse interpretation of the election is won by the Wall Street Journal's editorial page, which stated that the largest fall in demographic support for the GOP was among Hispanic voters, who "had good reason to feel stiffed." What reason was that? What else but the "recent attempts by Republican nativists to dramatically restrict legal immigration," which attempts accordingly "should be rethought on political grounds, if not for policy reasons." This argument has since been restated (in more or less identical terms) by Linda Chavez in the New York Times and again on the Journal's editorial page by Paul Gigot, who pinned the blame on the "Pat Buchanan - NATIONAL REVIEW - California Governor Pete Wilson wing of the GOP," from the standpoint of the WSJ - La Raza - Urban Institute wing of immigration enthusiasts. It plainly conveys the decision of the Establishment, Left and Right, on how we are to think about the political impact of immigration. And given its transparent absurdity, it will surely become Republican orthodoxy before long. So we should examine the fallacies embedded in it right away.

The problem is, where to begin?

First, the WSJ - La Raza - Urban Institute argument is based on the unthinking assumption that immigrants, Hispanic immigrants, and Hispanics generally favor existing levels of legal immigration. But poll after poll has shown the reverse. Most recently, the 1993 Latino national political survey (funded by a disappointed Ford Foundation) found that 80 per cent of Puerto Ricans, 75 per cent of Mexican-Americans, and 66 per cent of Cuban-Americans wanted to reduce immigration levels. Neither Mr. Gigot, Miss Chavez, nor the Journal's editor thought it necessary to address this point. Each simply assumed that minority groups that include large numbers of immigrants would favor high levels of immigration. They don't --except when the immigration issue has been successfully "racialized" by left-wing demagogues and their occasional conservative allies. (But see below.)

Second, voting by Hispanics in 1996 was broadly in line with their historic pattern, which is, roughly speaking, a 70 - 30 split between Democrats and Republicans. Every presidential election since 1972 confirms this. When the GOP won a landslide with Reagan in 1984, its share of the Hispanic vote rose to 37 per cent; when the GOP lost big this year, it fell to 21 per cent; and in closer elections, it has fluctuated, coming in at 24, 25, 30, and 33 per cent. But at no point have the Republicans come near to winning even a bare majority of Hispanics. They seem limited to a fluctuating quarter-to-a-third of them. Why?

The reason is, third, that immigration keeps the GOP share of the Hispanic vote low. To be sure, the longer individual Hispanics live in the U.S., the more assimilated and prosperous they become and so the more likely they are to vote Republican. Indeed, voting Republican is itself a sign of minority assimilation to the culture and identity of the American majority. Hispanics as a group might therefore be expected to move right over time -- except that new Hispanic immigrants are constantly arriving to swell the Democratic vote. This outweighs any shift to the right on the part of Hispanics already here.

A secondary effect is that large numbers of new immigrants tend to slow down the rate of assimilation -- and so the rate of switching to the GOP -- because they strengthen the cultural identity of Hispanics as a separate group. But the primary effect is a simple mathematical one: the higher the level of immigration, the higher the Democratic share of the Hispanic vote. And there is another half to this story.

It is reason number four: immigration swells the Hispanic share of the total U.S. population. And if a more or less stable majority of a growing segment of the population votes Democratic, then the Democratic share of the total vote must increase. The White House is aware of this -- which is why it told the Immigration and Naturalization Service to hurry up and naturalize new immigrants. Bob Dornan was not -- which is why he was a strong supporter of the Wall Street Journal's pro-immigration line (and is now out of office).

This effect -- reason number five coming up -- promises a massive shift of support from Republicans to Democrats for the foreseeable future if immigration continues at present rates. Current demographic projections (i.e., the Census Bureau's "middle series") forecast that the ethnic makeup of the U.S. in 2050 will be as follows: non-Hispanic whites, 53 per cent; blacks, 15 per cent; Hispanics, 21 per cent; and Asians, 10 per cent. If that had been America's ethnic shape in this election (and if ethnic groups had voted as they actually did), Clinton would have won 56 per cent of the popular vote instead of less than half. Indeed, applying those same criteria to the last seven presidential elections (and assuming that Asians would have split 60 - 40 to the GOP in those early elections where in fact there were too few of them for polls to separate out), Democrats would have won every election except 1972 -- and even then George McGovern would have got a respectable 47 per cent of the vote instead of his derisory 36 per cent.