The new shape of Europe - NATO decision not to allow Central European countries to become members

National Review, Dec 27, 1993 by Radek Sikorski

AT LAST, months of debate are coming to an end: Western diplomats are leaking their decision, due to be announced in January, not to admit any Central European states into the NATO alliance. Instead, Central Europeans will be encouraged to seek membership in the European Community. The idea is almost Marxist---economic integration is to be the base on which the superstructure might eventually grow. But instead of contributing to European stability, this decision may fatally weaken the elites who support capitalism and democracy in the East.

The Western security establishment's decision to spurn Central European advances looks, on the surface, hard-headed but sensible. As Lord Carrington, NATO's former secretary general, recently explained: "First, this would lead to considerable disquiet by the Russians .... Second, a number of the existing NATO members would not be very happy to guarantee the so-called integrity of Poland and some of the other countries." That "so-called" appears to be the nub of the matter. From it we might expect that the coming NATO summit is likely to offer Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia (the four serious candidates for membership) some lowgrade Western equipment and the chance to fool around at occasional joint maneuvers--but not much hope of a security guarantee.

When told of the emerging NATO consensus, President Yeltsin was reported to be "thrilled." But in the countries concerned, this fateful development is producing a massive sense of betrayal. Many in the East simply do not believe the West any more, and suspect that promises of EC membership are lightly made. Certainly when the EC comes to debate Central European membership years hence, Lord Carrington's objections will apply with even greater force. Russia will again protest against being excluded and nobody will point out (as nobody points out now) that a democratic, peace-loving Russia ought to welcome the opportunity to share a border with a member of a club she aspires to join, much as Poland welcomed the unification of Germany.

In addition, some EC members will oppose our accession to the European Community with even more vigor than they now oppose our NATO aspirations. Instead of future contingencies, fundamental economic interests will be at stake. Will the EC's poorer countries-Greece, Portugal, Ireland--risk the dilution of "cohesion" funds at their expense? Will France sacrifice support for her inefficient peasants in order to help Poland's inefficient peasants? Will Europe's 20 million unemployed welcome free access to their job market by 55 million voracious new workers?

Current EC policy could hardly be less friendly. EC trade negotiators haggle over the tariffs and restrictions on every kilo of Polish raspberries, every truckload of Hungarian lamb, every ton of Czech steel-even though our exports amount to only 1 per cent of all EC imports, whereas their own exports to Central Europe grow exponentially. Every upset in the Ruhr valley leads to a change in the steel quota. Every motor-way blocked with French squash causes negotiators to add new restrictions on Central European products. It is hard to believe that the EC will reform itself any time soon, and certainly not for the sake of solidarity with Central Europe.

The parallels to the 1920s and 1930s are striking. The Western establishment has similar illusions about the ability of multilateral institutions to overcome the iron laws of the balance of power, feels a similar urge to disarm, exhibits a similar indifference to the security concerns of Central Europe. In the 1920s and '30s, Europeans put their faith in the League of Nations-and saw it dashed with the invasions of Manchuria and Abyssinia. In the 1990s, Europeans put their faith in the EC and saw it dashed in the dismemberment of Bosnia. If the EC is today's League of Nations, and Bosnia is our Abyssinia, then NATO's blackbailing of Central Europe is the new Locarno--the 1925 treaty which secured borders in the West but not in the East.

But perhaps it is right for the West to stay well clear of that troublesome area. Didn't Britain pay dearly for allowing herself to be dragged into war over Danzig?

In fact, the lesson of the 1930s is that the West--and especially Britain and the U.S.--should have involved itself in Central Europe much earlier. It was not for the sake of our blue eyes, as we say in Poland, that Britain went to war in 1939, but because the balance of power on the Continent would have been fatally tilted if Hitler had gone unopposed in Central Europe: with Czech industry, Rumanian oil fields, and Polish slave labor, he could have dominated the rest of Europe, and almost did. The cold war reinforces the lesson that whoever controls Central Europe is a threat. It was only by occupying Central Europe, after all, that the Soviet Union posed a direct challenge to the West.

Fortunately, today's Germany is a model democracy and has been an advocate for Central Europe's interests. Understandably, Germany would like to extend the zone of security and prosperity-which today ends an hour's drive from Berlin. But Germany's influence has not been decisive in either NATO or the EC.