The shadow of a gunman

National Review, Dec 31, 1997 by Jonathan Stevenson

BELFAST

The Provisional Irish Republican Army's stated reason for bombing London's Canary Wharf in February 1996, ending a 17-month ceasefire, was that Sinn Fein, the IRA's political alter ego, had not been admitted to multi-party talks. After 17 months more of bombing and killing, the IRA declared a second ceasefire last July, and Sinn Fein is now participating in talks that began in September. On December 11, Sinn Fein president Gerry Adams and six delegates met with Prime Minister Tony Blair at 10 Downing Street. It was the first meeting between British and republican-Irish leaders at the Prime Minister's residence since Michael Collins signed the treaty that affirmed partition in 1921. But the IRA hard men still are not satisfied.

There is now a confirmed split in the republican movement, the first in more than ten years. Up to 35 members of the IRA (including the quartermaster-general) resigned in late October, and about 30 key Sinn Fein politicians subsequently left the party. Some of the dissidents have now formed the "32-County Sovereignty Committee" and elected Bernadette Sands-McKevitt, sister of hunger-striker Bobby Sands, vice chairman. To gain admission to the talks, Sinn Fein had agreed to the so-called Mitchell Principles, crafted by former Sen. George Mitchell, who is chairing the talks. The Mitchell Principles forbid violence as a means of political change, call for disarmament, and bind those who take part in the talks to any negotiated settlement. The dissenters contend that Sinn Fein violated its constitution in submitting to these restrictions.

The split compelled republican leaders to show their true colors, which differ from the dissidents' only by subtle shades. Sinn Fein councilor Francie Molloy, in an Orwellian attempt to pacify the IRA's militant South Armagh brigade, said that if talks fail "then we simply go back to what we know best." Violence, that is. Adams backed the statement. His endorsement has managed, for the moment, to stifle further public dissent within the republican movement. The implication, however, is that unless republicans get what they want Adams will support a return to violence. Thus, Adams effectively disavowed the Mitchell Principles and admitted that the current ceasefire (like the last one) is merely tactical.

This revelation should surprise nobody. The IRA has killed about 1,800 people, roughly a third of them civilians, over the past 28 years in its quest to end British rule in Northern Ireland. Sinn Fein, many of whose key members are ranking IRA men, draws 16 per cent of the vote in Northern Ireland, less than 4 per cent in the Republic of Ireland. The mainly Protestant unionist majority in Northern Ireland favors British rule. Although the largely Catholic nationalist minority wants Irish unity, most Northern nationalists oppose the IRA's tradition of physical force and vote for the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP). That the IRA and Sinn Fein remain unbowed by these circumstances reflects their lack of any genuine commitment to the democratic process.

Even with such a commitment, the Northern Irish problem would be intractable. Since social conditions for Catholics have improved during 25 years of direct British rule, the only substantial political issue is sovereignty -- which is not susceptible to compromise.

Compromises, of course, have been proposed. Most recently, in February 1995, the British and Irish governments proffered the Framework Document, which postulates cross-border institutions with open-ended powers to be fleshed out by a Belfast - Dublin assembly. To unionists, such a solution spells joint authority, which is a slippery slope to unification. To hard-line republicans, the solution does not delineate a sufficiently clear path to unification. The only player that the Framework Document might satisfy is the SDLP. Yet no comprehensive alternative has so far emerged.

Given these dynamics, it is highly unlikely that talks will produce a settlement. The Rev. Ian Paisley's Democratic Unionist Party has refused to participate, and is pressuring the larger Ulster Unionist Party to withdraw. Candid negotiators concede that they are merely "surfing" through issues without penetrating the difficult problems. Unionists have accused Sinn Fein of "refusing to engage," and vice versa. In short, any perceived progress in the talks is illusory. This paralysis is nothing new, several similar efforts having failed over the past 28 years.

The salient realities are two: 1) terrorism doesn't faze Ulster unionists, and 2) unionists hold the legally operative democratic majority. They already have what they want. Under two Anglo - Irish treaties (1922 and 1985) and an unbroken succession of British governing statutes, the consent of Northern Ireland's majority is required for a change in its constitutional status. Only Sinn Fein refuses outright to recognize the consent principle. But the position of nonviolent nationalists -- that Northern Irish citizens should have "equal allegiance" to Britain and Ireland -- is as untenable as republicans' insistence on joint authority and eventual Irish unity. Moreover, nationalists' notion of an "agreed Ireland" turns out to be a sedative label for procedural absolutism. According to John Hume, the SDLP's leader, it means that nothing can be agreed until everything is agreed -- a prescription for failure in any negotiation.