Boxed in in Bosnia - flaws in peace agreement designed by Cyrus Vance and David Owen - Editorial

National Review, March 1, 1993

YET ANOTHER Clinton campaign promise has gone into Promise Limbo, but this time the PreSident is a victim of circumstances. One of his platform planks we admired was his harder line on Serbia, which included a pledge to lift the perverse UN ban on arms for victims of Serbian aggression, plus a willingness (albeit limited) to contemplate military action. Upon coming into office, however, Mr. Clinton is boxed in by the Bosnian "peace plan" concocted by UN mediator Cyrus Vance and his EC sidekick David Owen.

Most of our allies have eagerly embraced the Vance-Owen plan, not because it contains any great strategic insight but because they want "peace" and it's the only plan on the table. Russia, moreover, is restless and is thought to be prepared to veto any stronger UN measures against their Slav brethren in Serbia. Mr. Vance and Lord Owen brought their road show to New York in early February, the better to pressure the Administration (which, of course, would be expected to furnish troops to enforce the plan). The Clinton team is right to cry "Whoa!" and to look for better alternatives.

Cyrus Vance has an unbroken record of being wrong on everything he has touched in thirty years, from Vietnam to Iran to Yugoslavia. David Owen has never been known for his strategic acumen. The plan they have come up with would divide Bosnia into ten semi-autonomous cantens according to predominant ethnic composition. Serbian control would be rolled back from the present 70 per cent of Bosnian territory to about 43 per cent; Croats and Muslims would each dominate about 25 per cent. The capital--the famous Sarajevo--would be jointly controlled. The plan has been flatly rejected by Bosnian Muslims. The Bosnian Serbs accept the principle of cantonization but consider the proposed boundaries inadequate. Only the Croats would accept the plan as is. The plan is doomed--largely by the perception that it consolidates too much of the Serbs' ill-gotten gains and "ethnic cleansing."

Ultimately, any hope for a settlement depends on the restoration of some kind of equilibrium of forces. And, if a settlement is to last, it cannot be based on ratifying Serbia's gains. The error of Mr. Vance, Lord Owen, and many another inept mediator is to press always for an immediate ceasefire to end the killing, a humane ideal which often merely consolidates an untenable status quo. Thus, thoughtful observers were encouraged by the recent upsurge of fighting in Croatia, which so alarmed the do-gooder community; what it represented was the Croatians reclaiming some of the territory the Serbs had seized last year. It is this turning of the tables that has, for the first time, led the Serbs to think seriously about settling.

In Bosnia, too, there must be more rollback of Serbian gains, by diplomacy or otherwise, before we can in good conscience press the Muslims to accept a settlement. The United States has a geopolitical stake in a solution that does not inflame Turkey or embarrass all our other moderate friends in the Islamic world. And, to repeat, a settlement will not last if it is seen as a Serbian steal. The Croatian reversal suggests we may be closer to the point at which Serbia is ready to negotiate in earnest. But the fighting may have to continue a while longer before this point is reached (and somebody may have to help the Muslims covertly). The Clinton Administration, by its perceived sympathy for those resisting Serbia, may have already added new weight to the diplomatic scales. We would urge the President to consider more decisive military options. As Lady Thatcher urged last Augnst, our negotiating leverage with Serbia will be much stronger if we are prepared to implement an overwhelming military blow.

In particular, we must continue to deter Serbian moves against Kosovo or Macedonia, which would produce an international conflagration (see Rossen Vassilev, p. 46). Serbian strongman Slobodan Mi1osevic has been deterred up to now, undoubtedly by the fear that a move in those areas would provoke the powerful Western response that has been so regrettably absent. The same leverage must be consciously wielded in the Bosnian negotiation. Without it, no amount of ingenuity or good intentions, on the part of the United States or any other mediator, will produce any positive result.

This kind of power-political insight has never been a characteristic of Warren Christopher, or indeed of most Democrats. Let's hope someone in the new Administration has learned something since Iran, even if Cyrus Vance has not.