Saddam's sweet deal

National Review, March 23, 1998

PRESIDENT Clinton's policy on Iraq seems to have been modeled on the military tactics of the noble Duke of York, who, it will be recalled, marched his men "to the top of the hill/And he marched them down again." The men in this case have not quite been marched down. They are staying put for the moment, in case Saddam Hussein violates the agreement so egregiously that even the French notice. The "severest consequences," according to the latest UN Security Council resolution, will then ensue. But what consequences precisely? The Clinton Administration was not able to answer that question the first time around, and it has not come up with a better answer since.

For the moment, however, the agreement signed by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz is in place. Let us not mince words: It is the product of weakness and incompetence; it is a victory for Saddam Hussein and a rebuff to the United States; and in the long term, it threatens the region with weapons of mass destruction wielded by a war criminal. The accord purports to require "immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access" by UN inspectors. But that access was already guaranteed by the 1991 ceasefire. What is new is that Iraq's "sovereignty," "dignity," "national security," and "territorial integrity" are to be respected -- clauses that Iraq will not fail to invoke the next time it wishes to obstruct. The UN inspectors -- hitherto a team of incorruptible technical specialists -- will now be accompanied by "senior diplomats" whenever so-called "presidential sites" (i.e., the secret compounds Saddam doesn't want inspected too closely) are to be examined. In other words, the inspectors are to be restrained by chaperones sensitive to diplomatic niceties. And who will supply these duennas -- China? Russia? France? In addition, Saddam has had four months to accelerate his chemical, biological, and missile programs as well as to perfect his methods of concealment. This lost ground cannot be recovered.

A charitable interpretation of this fiasco is that the Administration slipped up in letting Kofi Annan visit Baghdad, just as President Clinton's national-security team set themselves up at that Ohio State town meeting, walking blindfolded into a minefield of campus leftism and public doubts. But what did they expect of Kofi Annan's mission? This was what a "diplomatic solution" was bound to look like. A more cynical interpretation is that a fudge was what they wanted -- because they feared taking military action without any clear purpose.

If that is so, something may be retrieved from the wreckage of the Administration's policy. Given time, Saddam will certainly violate even the loose accords he has now accepted. President Clinton must use that time -- and the international odium which Saddam's violations will arouse (if intelligently exploited by U.S. public diplomacy) -- to adopt a stronger policy over the long term, as NR and some of Clinton's congressional critics have been urging. Such a strategy would aim to bring down Saddam rather than merely to irritate him. And not just Saddam himself, but the entire Baathist regime. It would include assembling a united Iraqi opposition, building up its military forces, assisting guerrilla activity in Iraq, rebuilding bridges to the members of the Gulf coalition, and above all making clear to all concerned that this time the U.S. is seriously engaged for the long haul.

On the other hand, maybe someone other than President Clinton should explain this new policy.