America and her friends

National Review, May 27, 1991 by Gerald Frost

IN THE new world over which President Bush says is struggling to be born, who will be America's friends and how will they assist it in times of trouble? In redefining its interests America will look naturally to its traditional European partners in the Western Alliance. America's expectations of these allies, however, have undergone some significant changes as a result of the Gulf War. Resentment at the miserable level of support given by some European countries may have somewhat diminished with the glorious victory. Americans are generous people with short memOries. But American policymakers are bound to ask themselves whether the European performance will be any better next time there is a call to arms. Will the Germans be m ore robust, the Italians, Spanish, and Belgians less ambivalent? Will the French be able to resist the temptation to launch unilateral gestures, proving loyal only when all other avenues have been exhausted?

There is at least one important reason why American leadership will be taken more seriously, which is that displays of military effectiveness such as the one we have recently witnessed convey a message that is universally respected. Close allies will mostly be reassured by such a remarkable display of competence.

There is also one reason for supposing that Europe will be less likely to be helpful than in the past, which is that with the political downfall of Margaret Thatcher rapid progress is being made toward a federal Europe. The U.S. has long favored a united Europe, believing originally that it would provide a bulwark against Communism. It was also taken for granted that a Europe that spoke with one voice would be a simpler and more straightforward entity to deal with.

Americans enthusiasts for a united Europe do not seem to have taken seriously the possibility that a common voice would not necessarily be a sympathetic one. They may also have overlooked the fact that the creation of a European superstate would not by itself end national conflicts, and therefore from America's point of view a united Europe might turn out to be less than the sum of its parts. Certainly the evidence suggests that had Europe had a common foreign policy and common defense structures at the time of the Iraqi seizure of Kuwait, Britain would have been restrained from giving the support it did. It also seems unlikely that a British prime minister would have felt free to urge America on to war, as Mrs. Thatcher did last summer.

In some British circles, progress toward a federal Europe is seen to have faltered as a result of the discordant voices raised during the Gulf crisis. Elsewhere in Europe, however, recent experience is seen as a reason for redoubling the efforts toward greater integration.

And the federalists appear to have won significant victories. They have obtained agreement in principle that European political cooperation must encompass a common security policy. Second, they have obtained agreement to upgrade the Western European Union (WEU), previously no more than a debating forum, to what might become a European caucus within NATO. Henceforth the WEU will accept guidelines from the EC. Many of those in favor of a tightly integrated Europe believe that in the future there will be a merger between the WEU and the EC. Indeed a current draft treaty presented by the EC presidency to the Intergovernmental Conference on European Union proposes exactly that. Only the Dutch, rightly fearful of the possible impact on relations with the U.S., have put up strong resistance. According to the British, once opposed to the whole idea of a common foreign and defense policy, the WEU will provide "a useful bridge" between NATO and the EC.

These developments seem to have caused profound misgivings to the U.S. ambassador to NATO, William Taft, who has perceived that they could result in the Europeans arriving at NATO council meetings with already agreed and fixed views that America might be powerless to influence. A stronger European pillar might have been created, but only at the expense of a weaker superstructure. Having quite suddenly lost its enthusiasm for the idea of further European integration, the U.S. government has circulated to European governments a paper stressing that any changes which might take place should not lead to an "internal bloc within NATO." The paper also stresses the importance of continued "globality of response" and urges that nothing be done to weaken the command structure.

Having fought an outstanding war, America is enjoying high prestige, and in other circumstances its word might be heeded. It is plain, however, that there are to be major reductions in the U.S. military presence, which five years ago stood at 320,000. It may now be reduced to 60,000. In such circumstances a U.S. supreme allied command will seem an anomaly, and U.S. leadership will be called into question.

If Not NATO, What?

MIGHTN'T the wisest course, therefore, be to conclude that NATO has outlived its usefulness and that in the future security must be based on alternatives structures? Why not take more seriously the plan of the German foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, to base European security on the 34-nation Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which in Genscher's wider, more fanciful scenarios would become answerable to the UN?