What George Shultz could learn from Don Corleone

National Review, August 1, 1986 by Tom Bethell

In Geneva, the central assumption of the arms talks-- that, in the absence of "legal' limits, Mr. Gorbachev will order his munitions workers to work overtime, and perhaps on weekends also, thereby overwhelming us with the sheer quantity of their arms--reigns unchallenged. No one ever asks this question: If such a simple avenue to victory in the global conflict were open to the Soviets, why would they be willing to forfeit it at the bargaining table?

Mr. Reagan has sought to placate the liberal-Soviet alliance by giving it what it wants, namely, negotiations, without actually giving anything away in the course of such talks. This of course is a recipe for endless talks. It is also a source of endless uncertainty and a sign of weakness. Furthermore, his opponents, far from being appeased by such a concession, scent a more complete capitulation.

Observe, for example, White House correspondent Lou Cannon's jeers of disbelief in the Washington Post. In claiming that SALT's ceilings could be breached as early as August, Defense Secretary Weinberger had "prematurely' buried the treaty, Cannon crowed. "Take all bets against this wishful forecast,' he added. "Other officials say the better bet is that the United States will remain in compliance until year's end, by which time Reagan will presumably have held his second summit with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.' The Cannon column read like a boast that the liberal-Soviet alliance could bully Reagan back into line before the SALT-breaching hour had arrived.

BEFORE EXPLAINING why negotiations with Communists cannot bear fruit (except for the Communists), let us look for the common denominator in all such negotiations.

In Afghanistan, Mr. Reagan has expressed the hope for a "negotiated end to the war.' Talks have been proceeding under UN auspices, the American hope being that the Soviets will lay down their arms, return to Russia, and permit the establishment of democracy--as though that was what they had all along been trying to attain. Former Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin showed that he had a clearer grasp of the situation. The USSR "must protect [its] revolutionary achievements' in Afghanistan, he said.

Here the Soviets invaded an adjacent country, ostensibly at the invitation of its puppet (Soviet-installed) government, and the U.S. belatedly responded with some assistance to the free Afghan remnant. The Soviets would like us to stop the aid, and so they proceeded straight to Geneva. They said they wanted a peaceful settlement, and of course they do want peace in Afghanistan--just as Georgia and the Ukraine belong to the zone of peace.

In these talks "Afghan' (i.e., Soviet-controlled) and Pakistani delegations are discussing what the New York Times calls "political guarantees of Afghan neutrality' (i.e., the exclusion of U.S. aid from the region). Not much is likely to happen at these talks, but still Mr. Reagan disconcertingly said after last November's summit that he believed Mr. Gorbachev was "sincere' in seeking a "negotiated solution' in Afghanistan.