Burundi: what sanctions meant on the ground

UN Chronicle, Spring, 1999 by Kathleen Cravero-Kristofferson, Marie Dimond

In reaction to the coup d'etat led by Pierre Buyoya on 25 July 1996, seven countries - Kenya, United Republic of Tanzania, Rwanda, Uganda, Zaire, Ethiopia and Cameroon - imposed an economic embargo on Burundi. The sanctions had clearly stated objectives: to end the illegality of the regime by exerting pressure to restore the constitution and National Assembly; lift the ban on political parties; and bring about unconditional negotiations between the warring factions.

The sanctions, however, ended up staying in place for nearly two and a half years. During this time, Mr. Buyoya gradually complied with the stipulated conditions, although the role of the embargo in bringing about this change remains controversial. Apart from launching an internal debate and participating in external negotiations, he initiated a series of political reforms that culminated in the establishment of an internal partnership in June 1998 and the expansion of the National Assembly to include representatives from all political parties and civil society.

On 23 January 1999, regional Heads of State finally acknowledged the headway made in the peace process and suspended the sanctions, albeit insisting that they could be reinstated if progress faltered.

There has been much debate about the political, economic and humanitarian impact - and thereby overall usefulness - of the sanctions. It is widely acknowledged that the sanctions did not achieve their desired short-term political effect. Much has also been said about their rather inconsistent and inefficient implementation. As time passed, neighbouring countries' borders became increasingly porous as businessmen from throughout the region found ways to circumvent the restrictions, resulting in large-scale profiteering that benefited a small group of entrepreneurs. This inevitably led to the creation of a parallel economy which undermined and largely replaced legal market activity. The fact that neighbouring countries themselves were often guilty of violating the sanctions, coupled with increasing reports of dissension among the "imposers" themselves, i.e. the neighbouring Heads of State, further undermined their credibility.

It has, in fact, proven difficult to discern between the specific effects of the embargo and the general effects of over five years of civil strife, insecurity, population displacement and restricted access. The lack of an effective monitoring system and reliable indicators has further hindered the ability to differentiate the effects of the crisis and the embargo.

Even before the current conflict, spurred by the assassination of the first democratically elected President, Melchior Ndadaye, on 21 October 1993, Burundi was one of the poorest countries in the world, with an annual per capita income of only $160 and 90 per cent of the population surviving on subsistence agriculture.

What little existed of Burundi's industry was dominated by a brewery and marginally enhanced by some food, chemical and textile processing. Furthermore, nearly all bilateral aid, upon which Burundi was heavily dependent, was gradually reduced after the events of October 1993 and nearly frozen after the coup in 1996.

Nonetheless, the sanctions clearly exacerbated an already declining economic situation, placing large segments of an impoverished population under even more hardship. The strain of rising fuel and food prices, compounded with a significant currency devaluation and stagnant wages, led to greatly reduced purchasing power. The general price index rose by 36 per cent over the course of the first year of the embargo, while the average weekly household expenditure for basic food items increased by as much as 120 per cent. Prices of public transportation, medicine, education and building materials, and vehicle spare parts also increased. The agricultural sector suffered from a lack of seeds, and the production of coffee and tea was curtailed as insecticides became scant and increasingly expensive.

Six to twelve months after the imposition of the embargo, prices began to stabilize at these higher levels as alternative supply lines were established, in particular for fuel, which determined prices of other goods. Still, the general population continued to make do with less, and inflation remained high.

As Burundi was no longer allowed to export coffee and tea, which accounted for as much as 85 per cent of export earnings, official government revenue diminished and foreign reserves were depleted. This led to decreased government spending and further cutbacks in the social services sector, placing the international humanitarian community under increasing pressure to make up for the shortfalls, particularly in the area of health.

The embargo had a direct impact on the operations of humanitarian agencies, even though a series of exemptions were granted for the import of fuel and relief items. Still, many organizations encountered long delays due to a cumbersome bureaucratic process in which each import first had to be cleared by the Regional Sanctions Coordinating Committee. This often required the involvement of United Nations offices in three different locations - Burundi, Kenya and Tanzania - and absorbed precious time and resources.