OPCW Confirms Destruction of Terrorist Chemical Weapons Facilities

UN Chronicle, Summer, 1999

Attacks with the highly toxic satin gas by the terrorist religious sect, Aum-Shinrikyo, in the Tokyo subway in 1995 still conjure up memories of intense panic, suffering and horror. Little, however, has been heard about the facilities in Yamanashi, used by the sect to produce these deadly terrorist weapons. These facilities were declared by the Government of Japan to the Hague-based Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which is engaged in implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention - the first disarmament agreement of its kind engaged in the elimination of an entire category of weapons of mass destruction. After a set of initial inspections required under the Convention, destruction plans for the facilities were drawn up and carried out. On 9 December 1998, a team of three inspectors from OPCW embarked on a special three-day mission to Japan, where they checked and Confirmed that the facilities had been completely destroyed.

Designed primarily to prohibit the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and related facilities and their destruction within a specified period of 10 years, the Convention encompasses a broad scope and covers not only military facilities but also facilities in the civilian chemical industry which deal with dual-use chemicals. With a membership of 121, and with signatures of another 48 countries worldwide, OPCW truly represents a new generation of multilateral disarmament institutions. Employing 209 highly trained inspectors out of roughly 500 personnel at its headquarters, the Organization has already received declarations confirming current or past activities related to chemical weapons from nine of its Member States. Four out of nine countries have declared existing stockpiles of chemical weapons. These weapons are slated for total destruction under continuous international monitoring. Over 400 inspections at more than 80 chemical weapons-related facilities, as well as at the civilian chemical industry sites in 28 countries, have been carried out by OPCW thus far. Its Director-General, Jose M. Bustani, strongly emphasizes OPCW's professional and impartial approach, which has imparted the character of robustness to the Organization as a whole and has already gained the well deserved trust and authority of the international community.

The Chemical Weapons Convention was negotiated in e Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and was a true product of the end of the cold war. At that time, the issue of chemical terrorism was not of primary concern to the negotiators, who in 1993 wanted instead to grasp the opportunity offered by history and favourable circumstances to wrap up as early as possible this unprecedented, nondiscriminatory agreement, designed to rid the world of existing stocks of chemical weapons and to establish mechanisms to prevent their acquisition or re-acquisition by any Member State. While the Convention deals with the issue of chemical weapons at the level of international law, it has, however, created favourable circumstances, which make it difficult to engage in chemical terrorism in those countries that have either signed or ratified the Convention. For instance, the Convention has reinforced the international norm against possession, production or use of chemical weapons, and has led to a regulation of the reporting of production or use of dual-use chemicals in each Member State. Such domestic legislation required by the Convention is meant to criminalize attempts to produce chemical weapons anywhere under their jurisdiction or control, and also make it illegal for its nationals to indulge in such activity anywhere.

The Organization can carry out investigations of alleged use in its Member States to check whether a chemical attack has taken place. The provisions of the Convention related to assistance and protection against chemical weapons have placed the means available to the future OPCW at the disposal of States that are threatened or attacked by chemical weapons. These provisions are especially useful for States that do not have well-developed capabilities to detect chemical weapons, defend against them, decontaminate affected areas, or treat victims of chemical attack.

OPCW itself provides a forum for coordinated international reaction and response to such incidents an option which did not exist before 29 April 1997. The real success of the Convention in eliminating chemical weapons and, at the very least, in helping States to be ready for combating any incidents involving the use of toxic properties of chemicals for purposes which do not fall under the category of non-prohibited purposes under the Convention, however, will depend on wider adherence, especially from among the 60-odd States that are still outside the regime.

This article was prepared for the UN Chronicle by the Secretariat of OPCW.