Corruption and democracy

UNESCO Courier, June, 1996 by Donatella della Porta

Political corruption has long been considered a disease typical of the pathological but temporary phases that precede the advent of democracy.

According to this reading of events, it is particularly likely to develop during the abrupt transition from a traditional society to a modern society in which a clear distinction is made between the public and the private spheres.

It seems to be associated with broadening participation in political life, in a situation where there are no structured political parties to act as intermediaries between citizens and the state; with massive urbanization and a drift from the land that brings a mass of disoriented new city-dwellers into contact with the complex machinery of a remote bureaucracy; with the rapid development of modern means of production that subordinate everything to market forces; and with a process of rapid cultural modernization that mixes together different and in some cases conflicting value systems.

In all these cases, corruption seems to be an "unofficial" measure of structural adjustment designed to repair a social fabric that has disintegrated as a result of economic and political pressure; it is a phenomenon that will disappear as soon as market and democratic forces are normalized(1).

It should not be surprising, therefore, that political corruption has mainly been studied by researchers specializing in the Third World and in transitional countries. In the industrialized countries, political corruption should only be a limited, marginal phenomenon. In short, the spread of corruption ought to be inversely proportional to the spread of democracy.

In the last few years, these views on the limited and marginal nature of political corruption in the industrialized countries have had to be revised. The huge political and financial scandal that has implicated dozens of elected officials and industrialists in Italy seems to have spread to other European countries as well as those on the Mediterranean rim. "Model" democracies such as France and the United Kingdom have also been rocked by financial scandals that have tarnished the reputations of leading political figures.

In other words we must take a fresh look at the relationship between corruption and democracy. If the growth of democracy does not lead to the demise of political corruption, we must get to grips with those characteristics of the democratic system that encourage or authorize it.

Cracks in the system

Two characteristics of modern democracies seem to me to promote the development of corruption: the increased number of decisions taken in the public rather than the private sector, and administrative decentralization, which increases the number of decision-making centres. The growth of welfare programmes, the expansion of the public sector and the proliferation of laws and regulations all favour the spread of corruption. Moreover, local government opens a much broader potential field to corruption because of the large number of private contracts that are made and the likelihood of avoiding scrutiny by the central government.

But though it may be true that the risks of corruption grow in proportion to the growth of state leverage in economic life, it must be recognized that a whole range of procedures is available to prevent the discretionary powers of the administration from being arbitrarily used. If corruption exists in spite of these procedures, it is because obstacles prevent them from working properly. What are these obstacles? What are the conditions that encourage people to act illegally and profit from opportunities for corruption?

Like all economic agents, corrupters and corrupted obey rational motives based on a desire for gain. Corruption increases if the expected benefits from it are higher than the risk involved(2). The extent of corruption is linked to the factors that determine its profitability.

The risks involved mainly consist of different kinds of sanctions (legal or administrative, official or unofficial) and the possibility of their being effectively used, which depends on the structure of the monitoring mechanisms. Where internal administrative procedures are concerned, one major deterrent is the existence of effective control mechanisms in government departments and offices. Monitoring procedures that apply both to bureaucracy and party financing are effective if the principle of separate accounting is fully respected and auditors have access to all the necessary data.

Investigating magistrates and an administrative inspectorate constitute a third kind of control mechanism, with the impact of possible sanctions depending on the investigators' degree of independence and on the material and legal means at their disposal. Concurrent holding of several offices, the overlapping of politics and the civil service, and the proliferation of purely formal checks are factors that reduce the risk that real sanctions will be taken. Finally, there is also a purely political check inherent in the idea of a change-over of power between political parties, in which case it is in the interest of opposition parties to denounce the actions of those in power in order to further their own chances of taking over. The absence of alternation in government over a long period may, therefore, eventually lead to corruption. It is also quite true that a corrupt political class may well co-operate to share the spoils between government and opposition parties.