Naval maneuvering - Letters

Washington Monthly, March, 2002

As a Navy engineer, I'm pleased to hear that the Navy is doing something correctly ("Studs and Duds," by Eric Umansky, December 2001). Most of us in the Navy civil service work tirelessly to provide the war fighter the best possible product. Ben R. Rich, the one-time head of Lockheed's aircraft developer in Burbank, Calif., wrote a book called Skunk Works in which he described the famous site where the U-2, SR-7, F-117 and the B-2 discussed in your article were all developed. In the book, Rich described the "10 Commandments" of a contractor, one of which was never to work with the Navy since "they will break your back, your balls, and your spirit? It is good to hear that that hard-nosed approach is paying off.

DR. WILLIAM J. SCHARPF
NAVAL RESEARCH LABORATORY
Washington, D.C.

"Studs and Duds" is based on a fundamentally flawed thesis that the Navy's rigorous testing of its systems results in better weapons on the battlefield. The Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW), which the author, without any evidence, holds up as a model weapons program, was originally conceived as a "joint" weapon with the Air Force. It has suffered a host of serious technological setbacks in recent months. The program is not "fully operational." In fact, until significant software problems are corrected, final production JSOWs cannot be used by Navy F-18 or Air Force F-16 aircraft. The JSOWs used in Iraq, Kosovo, and--in very limited numbers--Afghanistan, are early-production models. The story also grossly misrepresents the development of remotely piloted vehicles like Predator and Global Hawk. Both were developed by defense agencies (not the Air Force), without the cumbersome framework of regulations that burden traditional acquisition programs. To suggest that either would be in better shape had it gone through the Navy's testing program is ridiculous. How many remotely piloted vehicles has the Navy developed in the past 10 years? Zero.

JOHN ROBINSON
MANAGING EDITOR
Defense Daily
via email

As a defense reporter who followed the Air Force's Predator and Global Hawk programs, I'd like to point out a couple of inconsistencies in Umansky's article. Predator didn't follow the Pentagon's typical acquisition and testing process because it began as an "advanced concept technology demonstration"--an effort to swiftly field useful technologies. In fact, the Predator has been a victim of its own success. The program began in the early '90s, with its first flight only a few years later. By the late `90s the demonstration vehicles were flying combat missions in Bosnia and later over Kosovo. Weather problems have indeed been a problem. But the service is now procuring more de-icing kits to mitigate losses to weather. While the military has certainly made its share of egregious errors acquiring and employing systems, I don't think Predator was the best example.

AMY BUTLER
MANAGING EDITOR
Inside the Air Force
via email

Umansky muses of the V-22 Osprey that "had it gone through the Navy's testing system, the Osprey might be available to commanders in the field right now." The truth is, all U.S. Marine Corps aircraft, including the V-22, are developed and tested at the direction of the Navy's acquisition and test communities. The V-22 is actually one of the Navy's most embarrassing examples of how test results were ignored, overlooked, and misrepresented en route to acquisition milestones.

BRENT CRABTREE
INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES
Alexandria, Va.

Umansky Replies: The Pentagon considers the JSOW program to be "Navy-led." As for Mr. Robinson's assertion that I held it up as "a model weapons program," I simply said "It works." My evidence for that, as the piece made clear, is the Pentagon's own finding that JSOW "exceeded requirements" in Iraq. And so what if the Navy hasn't developed remotely piloted vehicles? My point wasn't that they develop every weapon. What sets the Navy apart is its commitment to a forward-thinking approach to testing every weapon. Regarding the Predator, Ms. Robinson is correct to note its accelerated development track, which I should have mentioned. But that doesn't change the fact that the system wasn't adequately tested: A decade into its development, the Pentagon still hasn't adequately tested the Predator. The Air Force could have chosen to fund further testing and deploying. Instead, it de-emphasized testing and paid a price. To Mr. Crabtree's assertion about the V-22 Osprey, the GAO agrees it was a "Marine Corps aircraft" developed with "Marine Corps requirements." Also: due to an editing error, the newsletter "Inside the Pentagon" was misidentified.