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Seoul on ice: conservatives are talking about pulling out of South Korea. Big mistake
Washington Monthly, May, 2005 by Soyoung Ho
Carpenter and Bandow do lauch one good attack against Seoul: South Korea wants the benefit of the alliance but doesn't want Washington to dictate its terms: "Although South Korea was not inclined to take over its defense even as it emerged on the international stage as a significant economic player, its evident success led to domestic calls for winning a greater say in the operation of the alliance." South Korea does need to do more for its own defense and be more responsible worldwide. It has made a responsible start by raising defense spending, and it has reached a pair of smart compromises with the United States, which all eventually draw the number of American troops in country down from 37,000 to 25,000 and move a large military base from downtown Seoul, where the U.S. military presence has Created near-constant friction with residents, to a more remote region.
Still, the sides seem headed, in the long term, for a more decisive separation. The Pentagon is convinced that the utility and viability of the U.S.-ROK alliance has gone down. South Koreans disliked Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld's handling of the issue of redeployment even if an eventual phasing out of troops should prove of national interest to both parties. That Rumsfeld has been both insulting and condescending in his approach only maximizes resistance and emotional backlash. South Korean officials have been privately upset over the issue as they were merely notified of America's intention to reduce troops in South Korea, though the United States has since shown more willingness to discuss the matter.
But the proper management of this likely parting of ways--while not letting these petty acrimonies prompt a retreat so quick that it destabilizes this crucial region--remains a point of shared interest. American and Korean strategists need to decide how to balance the growing regional role of China. Will U.S. troops retain the capacity to deploy off the peninsula, as some still argue that they should, or will Korea mature fast enough to play that "balancer" role (smoothing over frictions between China and Japan without necessarily siding with the United States) in the foreseeable future?
This stark, even polemical book may finally prove useful: By raising the possibility of such a dramatic solution, Carpenter and Bandow may force American strategists in Washington and Seoul, within and outside of government to figure out what they really think about the Korean conundrum and push it through to some rational next stage. South Korea and the United States must be honest about where each stands, which they have not done for at least two decades, as the old Cold War centered on Russia is replaced by struggles centered on Pyongyang and Beijing. The issue is beyond what to do with North Korea. The United States should think about what it would mean to have an alliance only with Japan in Northeast Asia while South Korea became more "neutral" and sided even with communist China. And South Korea must think about whether it wants a future without the United States. The alternative, in the near future, seems very risky.