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The crucible: how the Iraq disaster is making the U.S. Army stronger
Washington Monthly, July-August, 2004 by Phillip Carter
"This new training regimen has yet to reach all 482,000 soldiers in the Army; but there are more tangible signs of. progress. Before Iraq, support units often did not participate in large-scale, De-fire exercises with real bullets the way their combat brethren did. Now, every support unit preparing to deploy to Iraq goes through a convoy-ambush exercise with real bullets. Before Iraq, support units lacked enough war-fighting equipment--heavy machine guns, truck-mounted grenade launchers, night-vision goggles, and GPS devices-to protect themselves. Now the Pentagon has shipped these items to support units in the field and revised plans so that future deployments include the right equipment as a matter of course. Before Iraq, most Army Humvees and trucks had nothing" but canvas and thin aluminum for armor--which keeps out the rain, but not bullets. Today; the Army is rushing thousands of armored Humvees into the field, and retrofitting other vehicles with armor plates and sandbags.
Iraq has pushed the Army to be much more flexible with its frontline units, too. Traditionally; the Army's combat "branches"--infantry, armor, and artillery--have jealously guarded their purity, even when the situation on the ground demands flexibility and adaptation. Despite the global trend towards urbanization, and proof in places like Mogadishu and Sarajevo that urban combat was where armies would live and die in the 21st century, the Army's armor branch for years dung to the notion that tanks didn't belong in cities. This notion was finally put to rest on April 7, 2003, when an armored task force from the 3rd Infantry Division dashed into the heart of Baghdad, occupying the presidential palace grounds and several other key sites. Many military experts think this "thunder run" may have shortened the war by weeks or months, despite the fact that the plan had no foundation whatsoever in traditional Army doctrine. Since then, tanks have played a key role in counter-insurgency operations, sometimes to back up infantry with firepower and sometimes with simple intimidation. (The ground actually trembles when an M1A1 rank drives nearby.) Likewise, manpower demands in Iraq have given commanders more leverage to transform milts that aren't much needed into new capabilities that are. Active-duty artillery units a capacity provided in Iraq by the Air Force--have been converted into ad hoc infantry units that now patrol Baghdad and Fallujah. Back at home, the Pentagon has dispatched two artillery brigades from the National Guard to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, for MP training.
No one expects machine gun-equipped logistics troops or retrained artillery traits to execute complex combat missions. But the changes have allowed the Army to overcome some of the limits of its old-fashioned force structure and add manpower or capability where shortages exist.
Moreover, a willingness towards on-the-fly retraining moves our Army, over the long term, that much closer to a 21st century force adapted for asymmetric warfare. Army Maj. Donald Vandergriff, a noted reformer in the ranks, agrees, saying that he finally sews signs the Army is preparing "for the type of wars we am going to fight--expeditionary wars of rapid, no-notice deployments" where the missions could include peacekeeping, war fighting, and everything in between. Should our Army deploy to, stag the Sudan, it's possible that soldiers will find themselves as relief workers and truck drivers one minute, and infantrymen the next. Making sure every soldier can fight--and fight where needed--maximizes the prospects for every soldier coming home.
