Conflict and Compromise: How Congress Makes the Law. - book reviews

Washington Monthly, June, 1995 by Lewis W. Wolfson

We are getting a lot of lessons these days about how Congress and the Constitution ought to work. My new talk-radio friend Ollie North says the Congress is "no longer the kind of representative government the Founding Fathers intended it to be." If Ollie's Republican friends don't succeed in bringing the Congress back to the glory days of gentleman farmer/legislator, it won't be for lack of trying. Their methods might make some but not all) of the Founding Fathers proud: Ram through legislation and get the job done in the morning so citizen legislators can get back to plowing the fields in the afternoon.

In this mood, there is something almost refreshing about a book on a bill that Congress took a decade to pass: the Family and Medical Leave Act. The bill, signed by Bill Clinton in 1993, guarantees Americans up to 12 weeks of unpaid leave from work to care for newborn children or sick relatives. It is one of the most popular bills in the last decade - in 1991, 76 percent of Americans approved of the bill - and yet it wound its way through six Congresses, countless "final" votes, and two vetoes by George Bush over the course of 10 years. Elving, the political editor of Congressional Quarterly, does a masterful job of charting each twist and turn in the bill's evolution into law, reminding us of the effort representative democracy can demand, even for an idea whose time has come.

The saga of the Family and Medical Leave Act began in 1984 when a federal judge ruled that a California law requiring a company to grant four months of disability leave to a pregnant female employee violated federal statutes requiring equal treatment of men and women in the workplace. Howard Berman, who had steered the law through the California legislature, was now a U.S. congressman. Berman wanted a federal law based on the California model and searched for ways to make the law resistant to court challenges.

The coalition-building began immediately. Berman first turned to Donna Lenhoff of the Women's Legal Defense Fund for help. Lenhoff suggested a key shift that reduced the prospect of court challenges, but even more important, gradually lured some House conservatives under the "Family Leave" tent. By protecting the job rights of anyone who had to take leave to care for a disabled or ill spouse, child, or aging parent, in addition to newborns, the bill would not be considered a "women's bill" but a "family bill." Over time, Democratic Representatives Pat Schroeder of Colorado, Bill Clay of Missouri, Bill Ford of Michigan, and New Jersey's Marge Roukema (an early Republican supporter) played pivotal roles. Connecticut's Christopher Dodd led the drive in the Senate.

It wasn't easy. Businesses, especially smaller firms, did not want to be stuck with what was seen as more "social engineering." When it became clear that Bush would veto the legislation, the small business lobby became crucial because many of its Republican friends in Congress would be needed to override the Bush veto. Over time, congressmen reached a compromise that would exempt businesses with under 50 employees. Small business was never in love with the Family and Medical Leave Act, but its opposition to the bill was sufficiently muted to enable the bill's sponsors to lure moderate Republicans into the fold.

While women's organizations spearheaded the effort, other groups played roles and each had its own unique priorities. The Catholic bishops' lobby strongly supported the pro-family bill but would run at any hint of leave for abortions. The AARP would sign on only if it could secure leave for the care of aging parents. Organized labor would leave the table if workers' rights were traded for business's support. With every change in wording, the support of interest groups and members of Congress shifted. Even at the end, three Republican freshwomen who had been thought to be supporters of the bill spoke out against it.

The bill reached its final form in 1991, passing both houses of Congress only to be vetoed by Bush, who said the bill would tie the hands of businesses. An attempt to override the veto failed, but Congress re-introduced and passed the bin without any major changes in 1992, at the height of the presidential campaign, knowing Bush would veto the bill again and leave himself open to charges that he was "anti-family."

After Clinton was inaugurated, he made the Family and Medical Leave Act his first piece of legislation, signing it on the White House lawn on February 5, 1993. Had the various compromises required to build the coalition undercut the law's social benefit? Thus far, there is little reason to believe so. To be sure, Elving writes, many Americans cannot afford to leave work for three months without pay, even if their jobs will be waiting for them. But millions of Americans now have an option they didn't have two years ago.

This is a book about process, not about white hats and black hats, or blood on the House floor. The players are not pictured as PAC-driven or obsessed with ideological agendas. Key staffers feel that pragmatism and compromise are tools to bring about a worthy end. You won't read about Chris Dodd's nocturnal habits, or whether Pat Schroeder cashed checks in the House bank. And refreshingly little time is spent dwelling on political chest-pounding and vapid soundbites - too often what the public sees and hears about Congress m the press.