The GOP's master strategist - William Kristol - Cover Story

Washington Monthly, Sept, 1994 by Jon Meacham

It's how, for example, we won World War II and the Cold War. From about 1940 to about 1965, American foreign policy was largely bipartisan, and congressional Republicans, on issues such as Lend Lease and the Marshall Plan, supported FDR, Truman, and Kennedy. In turn, congressional Democrats supported Eisenhower. On the critical foreign matters of that time, there was a prevailing understanding that fascism and communism were problems that had to be confronted, so cooperation was at a premium. And on some major domestic landmarks that shape the way we live now, more Republicans joined in than not. In the years when most Americans thought we ought to abolish segregation and provide health insurance for the elderly, cooperation worked. On the Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1964, and 1965, for instance, only a handful of Republicans in Congress dissented; in 1965, Medicare passed with more House Republicans voting yes than voting no.

A similar kind of consensus about some domestic problems exists today - again, on schools, welfare, crime, and values. But Kristol ("Inevitably, Republicans in Washington are going to spend most of our time opposing Clinton") constrains solutions, even where he agrees with the president in general. This is because, under the rules of the game Kristol is playing, he wins only when Clinton loses ("Republicans should not busy themselves seeking promising signs or areas of possible agreement in the president's plan.") But what's good for Kristol is not always what's good for the country. That's why opposition for opposition's sake is so ultimately destructive.

Asked where he might cooperate with Clinton, Kristol says, "To the degree to which Clinton comes back to the New Democratic message, I would support him. But inevitably I think we would want to go farther and get other things, too." That is, simply, a loss for the Republic. As the welfare example shows, even where real progress is possible, Kristol chooses to use his formidable skills to obstruct clearly needed action.

So the hour of possible cooperation slips away. Meanwhile, Kristol has unabashed visions of this period being like the Carter interregnum, when supply side economics took wing and gave the Reagan forces of 1980 an intellectual veneer. Kristol and his fellow Republicans are playing for cheers, points, and victory. At the end of the day, however, they don't care what the game is

really about - all of us - but only that the win.