The Rogers Commission failed; questions it never asked, answers it didn't listen to - Challenger accident

Washington Monthly, Nov, 1986 by Richard Cook

The NASA launch procedure calls for decisions--and objections--to methodically follow a prescribed path up three levels. Stanley Reinartz, as the Marshall Space Flight Center's shuttle projects director, was on Level III. On Monday evening before the launch, he visited a motel room at the Merritt Island Holiday Inn just outside the Kennedy Space Center, in order to tell his superior, William Lucas, that there was going to be a teleconference during which they would prepare to notify Level II--Arnold Aldrich--about Thiokol's concerns. Lucas was the director of the Marshall Space Flight Center and reported directly to Jesse Moore. Also present was Lawrence Mulloy, the solid rocket booster chief, and James Kingsbury, the science and engineering director.

But Reinartz, the story goes, did not inform Lucas of the intention to go to Level II with Thiokol's O-ring objections. He says he just told Lucas that Thiokol had expressed some concern. Lucas said he merely asked to be kept informed. Reinartz says he didn't tell Aldrich or Moore any of this because he viewed Thiokol's expression of concern as a routine matter that had been "resolved.'

By not discussing these concerns with Levels II or I, Reinartz would be going against instructions given by Jesse Moore earlier that afternoon to report back my constraints on the launch. Furthermore, if this was a routine problem, why did he visit the motel? And why did NASA require written approval from Thiokol's headquarters in Utah, an unprecedented procedure? Why did NASA officials put such pressure on Thiokol to consent, with one official uttering the memorable words: "My God, Thiokol, when do you want us to launch, next April?'

It's hard to believe that under those conditions Reinartz, a mid-level manager relatively new on the job, simply didn't think it was important enough to tell his superiors. It's also difficult to believe he would make such a decision on his own. Moreover, for five to six hours the morning of the launch, Reinartz and Lucas worked next to Aldrich and Moore, yet all parties claimed that not a word was spoken of the O-ring controversy that had consumed approximately ten hours of discussion the previous afternoon and night.

Although their description of events is hard to believe, it is also hard to disprove--in part because the commission was so timid in its questioning of witnesses. For example, at one point, Rogers asked Reinartz about the discussions at the hotel room:

Reinartz: "I discussed with them the nature of the telecon, the nature of the concerns raised by Thiokol, and the plans to gather the proper technical support people at Marshall for examination of the data. And I believe that was the essence of the discussion.'

Rogers: "But you didn't recommend that the information be given to Level II or Level I?'

Reinartz: "I don't recall that I raised that issue with Dr. Lucas. I told him what the plans were for proceeding. I don't recall, Mr. Chairman, making any statement regarding that.'