The Rogers Commission failed; questions it never asked, answers it didn't listen to - Challenger accident

Washington Monthly, Nov, 1986 by Richard Cook

Then, just as Rogers had been getting at an important issue--what Reinartz told his superiors about the raging Thiokol debate--the chairman ended the discussion. No follow-up questions, such as, "Did you tell Lucas that the Thiokol objections were serious enough that the engineers had actually recommended not launching?' or "Did Lucas indicate that he wanted Thiokol to change its mind?'

Sometimes they elicited interesting information, but it was not used to draw any sterner conclusions. For instance, Rogers had scolded Lucas for giving a misleading characterization of what happened at the teleconference. "You're describing the telecon as though it were just sort of one of those ordinary things, and I don't believe that is accurate.' Rogers asked Lucas why he didn't tell his superiors, Aldrich and Moore, and Lucas responded that he thought the issue had been resolved and that he was not part of the formal decision ladder. Rogers then asked a good followup question:

Rogers: "You had occasion, though, to talk to both Mr. Aldrich and Mr. Moore before the launch?'

Lucas: "Yes, sir.'

Rogers: "And whether it was in the line of authority or not, you had ample opportunity to pass on the information that there has been serious concern about the seal, isn't that right?'

Lucas: "Yes sir, I had the opportunity to talk to them.'

Rogers: "Okay. I have no further questions.'

A cover up?

This compilation of contradictions and irregularities in the testimony of NASA officials might, by now, have raised the question in a few readers' minds whether these officials might intentionally have misled the public or the commission.

There is other testimony that reinforces the possibility that there was a cover up. For example, Allan McDonald, the Thiokol engineer who had objected to the take-off for safety reasons, testified that Lawrence Mulloy, the NASA official who aggressively pushed for the launch, had later tried to intimidate him. "Mulloy came into my office and slammed the door,' McDonald said during the May 2 hearing, "and as far I was concerned, was very intimidating to me. He was obviously very disturbed and wanted to know what my motivation was--and I won't use his exact words--for doing what I was doing [cooperating with the commission] . . .. He said . . . "As I understand it, you're giving information to the commission without going through your own management, without going through NASA and what's your motivation for doing that?' And I told him to calm down, that I didn't think I had to get a note from my mother or anyone to give anybody information, and I felt it was appropriate to give them information.'

Commissioner Robert Hotz then asked, "Did you get the feeling that there might be some feeling on the part of the Huntsville [The Marshall Space Flight Center] people that they wanted to control this flow of information to the commission?' McDonald responded: "I got the feeling that was happening.'

Then there is the letter written by a Marshall employee, signed, melodramatically, "Apocalypse.' Such an anonymous letter should be read skeptically, though this one seems to have accurately predicted NASA officials' behavior. The letter's author, who displayed an intimate knowledge of Marshall managerial process and past booster rocket problems, gives a detailed description of a private meeting he claims was called by William Lucas at the Marshall Center, at which plans for a cover-up were laid out: "Under Phase I of the cover-up, information was to [be] withheld as long as possible then fed to the press piecemeal. It was reasoned that the longer the information could be covered up the better, as the course of world events would eventually tend to dilute the initial shock and public reactions. . . . Once data could no longer be held back, Phase II would be to present as much highly technical data as possible, letting the situation in the general public's mind be diluted by various conflicting theories which were sure to result. Stories were to be planted which would serve to shift the blame away from [Marshall Space Flight Center] to Thiokol and the contractors doing the processing at the Cape.' The closest the Rogers Commission report came to reprimanding NASA for being less than forthcoming was the sheepish acknowledgement that "for the first several days after the accident-- possibly because of the trauma resulting from the accident--NASA appeared to be withholding information about the accident from the public.'