Putting disarmament on the shelf - Up front: news and opinion from independent minds - Brief Article

Humanist, March-April, 2002 by David Krieger

The Bush administration has conducted the first Nuclear Posture Review since 1994 and has released a classified version of the report to Congress, According to public statements by the Department of Defense, the report provides an updated strategic nuclear plan for the United States. It clarifies Bush's promise to Russian President Vladimir Putin to reduce the deployed U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal by two-thirds--to between 2,200 and 1,700--over a ten-year period.

The Bush nuclear posture stands on three legs. First, deactivated nuclear weapons will be kept in storage rather than destroyed. Second, the nuclear weapons that are deactivated will be replaced by powerful and accurate conventional weapons. Third, missile defenses will be deployed ostensibly to protect the United States from attack by a rogue state or terrorist.

Despite the planned reductions in the nuclear arsenal, the Bush administration intends to retain a flexible responsive capability by putting a portion (perhaps most) of the deactivated warheads into storage, making them available for future use. The problem with this approach is that it will encourage the Russians to do the same. This means that the promised disarmament won't be disarmament at all. It won't lead to the destruction of the nuclear warheads, nor will it be irreversible--as called for by the parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It will be subject to reversal at any time for any reason, by the Russians as well as the United States.

In essence, the Bush administration is hedging its bets and simply putting nuclear weapons on inactive reserve, ready to be activated should Bush or any future U.S. president decide circumstances warrant doing so. This sends a message to the Russians that we don't trust them and that we no longer intend to follow the path of irreversible reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the two countries as set forth in verifiable treaties. Russia will likely follow our lead and also put deactivated nuclear weapons into reserve stocks, where they will be subject to diversion by terrorists. This would be highly unfortunate since Russia would prefer to make the nuclear reductions permanent and irreversible.

The new nuclear posture also calls for cutting down the time necessary to reinstate a fun-scale U.S. nuclear testing program should the administration decide to do so. This also fits the pattern of flexible response. According to Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz:

   Recognizing that the world can change in dangerous and unpredictable ways,
   we are putting more emphasis than we have in the last 10 or 15 years on
   that underlying infrastructure that allows you, including in the nuclear
   area, to rebuild capabilities or build new ones if the world changes.

A second factor driving the Bush administration's nuclear posture is its belief that conventional weapons now have the capability to replace nuclear weapons in deterring an enemy from attacking. According to Wolfowitz:

   We're looking at a transformation of our deterrence posture from an almost
   exclusive emphasis on offensive nuclear forces to a force that includes
   defenses as well as offenses, that includes conventional strike
   capabilities as well as nuclear strike capability.

It is anticipated that many of the nuclear warheads being placed in storage will be replaced, particularly on the submarine force, by highly accurate, precision-guided conventional warheads, capable of doing enormous damage.

A third factor figuring prominently in the Bush administration's nuclear posture is its plan to deploy missile defenses. Over the continuing objections of Russia, China, and many U.S. allies, Bush has made it clear that he intends to move forward with deployment of ballistic missile defenses that will violate the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. In December 2001, Bush gave formal notice to the Russians that the United States will withdraw from this treaty in six months.

The Bush administration argues that withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and deployment of ballistic missile defenses will make the United States safer, but this is a very unlikely proposition. Instead, it makes Russia nervous about U.S. intentions, and this nervousness must be increased by the Nuclear Posture Review's emphasis on retaining the deactivated nuclear warheads in storage. U.S. deployment of ballistic missile defenses will also force China to expand its nuclear deterrent force with increased targeting of the United States. Increases in China's nuclear arsenal may also touch off a new nuclear arms race in Asia.

The bottom line of the new U.S. nuclear posture is that it is built on smoke and mirrors. It will reduce the number of deployed nuclear weapons but will keep them on the shelf ready to be reinstated on short notice. It will also retain enough nuclear weapons to destroy any country and annihilate its people. Recent computer-based estimates generated by the Natural Resources Defense Council indicate that eliminating Russia as a country would take fifty-one nuclear weapons; China would require 368 due to its large population. On the other hand, the United States could be destroyed as a country with 124 nuclear weapons, and all NATO countries, including the United States could be destroyed collectively with approximately 300 nuclear warheads.