The Myth of Biological Personhood

Humanist, Sept, 2000 by Karen Ann Gajewski

As the focus of philosophical discourse, courtroom sagas, political platforms, and even incidences of violence, the question of personhood--when life begins--has been the underlying issue in all debate over abortion.

Perhaps the most misunderstood part to the whole controversy is the implausibility of ever reaching consensus. Such agreement could only be achieved if people were to lay aside their individual belief systems. And turning to science to settle the argument won't help because personhood can't be determined by science; there is no empirical evidence by which to judge it, there is no biological moment in human development that signals life has begun.

At a conference held over a decade ago to discuss the issue of personhood, leading scientists, legal experts, and theologians concluded that, if brain death is viewed medically as the end of human life, then no beginning of human life is logically possible before brain life. And since fetal brain activity doesn't emerge any earlier than five months and isn't reasonably developed until seven months, then, medically, personhood begins near the juncture of the second and third trimesters--after 99 percent of all abortions have been performed. Furthermore, despite the existence of brain functioning, there is still the issue of independent viability.

The Supreme Court avoided taking a position on the issue of personhood in its 1973 landmark Roe v. Wade decision, when it observed that the question of when a human life begins cannot be referred to some expert discipline for resolution. And in their 1989 amici curiae brief prepared for the Supreme Court case of William Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 167 scientists and physicians, including twelve Nobel laureates, argued:

   There is no scientific consensus that a human life begins at conception, at
   a given stage of fetal development, or at birth. The question of "when a
   human life begins" cannot be answered by reference to scientific principles
   like those with which we predict planetary movement. The answer to that
   question will depend on each individual's social, religious, philosophical,
   ethical, and moral beliefs and values.

The brief further noted that "science cannot define the essential attributes of human life any more than science can define such concepts as love, faith, or trust."

So if science can't biologically determine personhood, what can? It is the responsibility of society to define and protect personhood, and therein lies the problem.

Proponents of abortion generally argue that personhood begins at birth, when the fetus is no longer biologically attached and dependent on the mother's body. The woman must have full autonomy over her person, and it is solely within her discretion whether to allow her body to house a fetus until birth.

Anti-abortion advocates, on the other hand, insist that personhood begins at the "moment of conception" when sperm and ovum initiate interaction. Regardless of the viability of the fetus, they would afford it protections and rights, even to the exclusion of the host. This denies the woman autonomy over her body and undermines her personhood.

Anti-abortionists most often misunderstand or misconstrue a woman's right to bodily integrity and autonomy as an argument over "property rights." But the issue goes much deeper and is far more profound. Unlike a coat we can put on or take off, unlike a house we can enter or leave, our bodies are inextricably connected to our personhood. It is the very fabric of our being. And it's through our body and its limitations and extensions that we ultimately become a particular type of person.

If someone else controls my body I lose the basic right of self-determination. If the law controls my body, it is violating its most basic obligation to me. Such violation is called slavery and society finds it unacceptable in all other circumstances; it must find it equally unacceptable in regards to abortion. Just as one cannot be coerced into donating blood or organs, a woman must not be coerced into donating her body.

In the end, the dividing line between nonperson and person could be determined as the point at which the fetus becomes an accepted member of the human community--when it is welcomed into society as a biological, independently functioning entity. Science can't determine this, only our values and ethics can.

Karen Ann Gajewski is an editor with the Humanist.