Moral consequences - Letters to the editor

Humanist, Sept-Oct, 2002

In regard to Daniel Elkind's article "The Moral Code and the Trials That Test Our Adherence to It" ("Philosophically Speaking," July/August 2002): while it is certainly true that humanists cannot and shouldn't blindly follow a priori ethical rules for the sake of rules, and while one should always examine the possible consequences that may come from a chosen course of action, I find Elkind's application of consequentialism troubling.

His basic premise seems to be that one should judge an action solely on the ultimate result. Kepler stole Brahe's books for personal aggrandizement. But that's "okay" because ultimately science (and human civilization) profited. The students at Steinmetz cheated (again for personal aggrandizement). But that's "okay" because they made a statement about classism and discrimination.

Today in our country, opponents of the slavery reparations argument (both white and black) argue that African Americans are far better off than their African counterparts. Using Elkind's argument, that fact would "legitimize" slavery. Likewise, I have heard some religious people remark that the Holocaust was part of "God's plan" to create the state of Israel. It strikes me as problematic at best, dangerous at worst, to see largely unintended consequences of one's actions as an excuse to legitimize those actions. Just as bad results sometimes are the unintended consequence of actions undertaken with the best of intentions, so too good may sometimes come from the worst of intentions.

Isn't it better to view Kepler's theft as an unfortunate episode that taints an otherwise admirable life? Isn't it better to see the actions of the Steinmetz students as an understandable but mistaken reaction to the legitimate rage the students felt at the unfairness of the system, rather than as a model for emulation? What lessons do we want society to teach? Will those who read of Kepler's theft see it merely as a pragmatic way to get ahead in the very competitive world of modern scientific research? Will students reading about Steinmetz internalize an ideal of struggle for social justice and equality or a "win at any cost" philosophy?

It seems to me that we need to choose our moral principles carefully and evaluate decisions and actions in light of those principles, reason, and possible consequences. Elkind's theory, I fear, can serve to validate and legitimize any action, no matter how selfish or harmful to others, provided that at some future time some good is seen to have come from it. I don't think this was the author's intent but I believe it is a very real possibility.

Leo V. Nagorski
Pittsburgh, PA