Facing the failures of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty regime

Humanist, Sept-Oct, 2003 by David Krieger, Devon Chaffee

Each year the future of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) regime becomes more uncertain. In the past year alone: North Korea has become the first country ever to withdraw from the treaty, and there has been virtually no progress and considerable regression on the thirteen practical steps for nuclear disarmament agreed to at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. The United States has reasserted policies of nuclear weapons use that undermine the negative security assurances promised to non-nuclear weapon state parties to the NPT in 1978 and again at the 1995 NFT Review and Extension Conference. The doctrine of preemption--or more accurately of preventive war--as pursued by the United States and adopted by other states with nuclear weapons threatens to accelerate nuclear weapons proliferation in the face of the threat of aggressive use of force. In addition, bilateral policies of the nuclear weapons state parties to the NPT are increasingly integrating those nuclear weapons states outside of the NPT regime--India, Israel, and Pakistan--as legitimate nuclear powers through the elimination of sanctions and technology exchanges.

The NPT regime obligations are having less and less success in restraining the irresponsible behavior of nations, especially the treaty's nuclear weapons states and the United States in particular. As nuclear weapons states move further away from their obligations tinder the treaty, they simultaneously weaken incentives for non-nuclear weapons state parties to the treaty to remain within the NPT regime. If such regressions continue, they will inevitably lead to an abandonment of disarmament goals and the gradual lack of interest by nonnuclear weapons states to remain within the regime's boundaries. It is time for members of the NPT regime to issue a clear statement outlining how the treaty is being undermined and by whom.

When U.S. Ambassador Eric M. Jarvits stated at the 2002 NPT Review Conference Preparatory Committee that Washington no longer supported many of the conclusions agreed upon at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, he was clearly alluding to the thirteen practical steps to achieve complete disarmament under Article VI of the treaty. Since the 2002 NPT meeting, not only has no progress been made in fulfilling these steps but nuclear weapons states--the United States in particular--have pursued policies that demonstrate significant regression from fulfillment of their Article VI obligations.

During this period there have been no further ratifications of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by nuclear capable states, including nuclear weapons state parties to the NPT. There has been no progress in moving toward a fissile material treaty. The principles of irreversibility and verification have been undermined by the United States and Russia in the Moscow Treaty, which lays out reversible offensive reductions without providing for any verification methods. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) and the START II arms reduction efforts have been entirely abandoned as has any progressive efforts toward START III. No effort to work toward the elimination of nuclear weapons has been made, and the United States is even conducting studies on new nuclear weapons designs. The thirteen practical steps have progressed in only one area: some nations submitted reports with regard to their Article VI obligations at the 2002 PrepCom, a process that is still being resisted by many nuclear weapons states, including the United States.

At the NPT's inception, disarmament obligations under Article VI played a key role in convincing non-nuclear weapons states that it was in their best interest to sign the treaty, though it restricted their ability to develop nuclear weapons. As these disarmament obligations continue to be ignored by the nuclear weapons states, they eliminate a significant incentive for non-nuclear weapons states to keep their side of the bargain.

The United States has clearly stated its policy to use "overwhelming force" against chemical or biological attacks. This policy was reiterated in the U.S. National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction issued in December 2002, which states, "The United States will continue to make clear that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force--including through resort to all of our options--to the use of WMD against the United States, our forces abroad, and friends and allies."

Such policies undermine the negative security assurances promised by the United States in 1978 and reaffirmed at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. They are intended to reassure non-nuclear weapons states that they need not worry about becoming the target of a nuclear weapons attack. Yet, as the United States has reserved the right to use nuclear weapons in response to a chemical or biological weapon attack for some years, the continued emphasis on this first strike policy undermines nonproliferation goals. When the United States, despite its overwhelming conventional military superiority, takes up a policy that requires nuclear weapons to carry out a strike against a potential chemical or biological weapons threat, other states are likely to conclude that nuclear weapons are also necessary for their security